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PSYCHOLEGAL RESEARCH: PAST 
AND PRESENT 
Wallace D. Loh* 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY. By A. Daniel 
Yarmey. New York: The Free Press. 1979. Pp. xvi, 285. $15.95. 
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY. By Elizabeth F. Loftus. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1979. Pp. xiv, 253. $15. 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN COURT. By Michael J. Saks and Reid 
Hastie. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co. 1978. Pp. ix, 245. 
Clotn, $14.95; paper, $7.95. 
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND ITS PSYCHOLOGY. By Al-
fred Cohn and Roy Udo!f. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co. 
1979. Pp. xi, 345. $17.95. 
At the start of the 1970s, a "new and growing interest in the rela-
tionship between law and psychology" was observed.1 By the end of 
the decade, various institutional developments - including an "ex-
plosion"2 in the publication of articles and books;3 the appearance of 
specialized journals;4 and the establishment of interdisciplinary 
training programs and professional societies5 - seemed to augur the 
• Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of Psychology, University of Washington. B.A. 
1965, Grinnell College; M.A. 1968, Cornell University; Ph.D. 1971, The University of Michi-
gan; J.D. 1974, Yale University. - Ed. 
l. Katz & Burchard, Psychology and the Legal Enterprise, l 9 KAN. L. REV. 197, 199 (1971 ). 
2. Saks, On Tapp (and Levine), 77 MICH. L. REV. 892, 897 (1979). 
3. A survey of various psychological journals showed a "significant increase" in the 
number of psycholegal studies published since the early 1970s. See Tapp, Psychology and the 
Law: An Overture, 27 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 359, 363 (1976). From the turn of the century to 
1966, only about half a dozen books on law and psychology were published in English. All are 
cited in the first part of the article. More books on the subject have appeared in the past three 
years than in the preceding three quarters of a century. 
4. E.g., LAW & PSYCH. REV., J.L. & HUMAN BEHAVIOR, CRIM. JUST. & BEHAVIOR. Only 
28 years ago, a group of leading law teachers and psychologists concluded that there was no 
need for a journal of law and psychology. School Developments, Summary of a Coeference on 
Law and Psychology, 5 J. LEGAL Eouc. 355, 361 (1953). 
5. Joint degree programs have been established recently at the University of Nebraska and 
the University of Maryland (in collaboration with the Johns Hopkins University). Since the 
mid-1960s the Russell Sage Foundation has funded various nondegree granting law and social 
science programs at different law schools, including a law and psychology program at Stanford 
Law School. The principal professional organization, the American Psychology-Law Society, 
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"coming of age"6 of the relationship. The four books reviewed here 
provide a representative sample of the breadth and quality of current 
empirical research. This Review uses these books as a springboard 
for an historical, conceptual, and methodological assessment of the 
field. It begins with an intellectual history of the relations between 
the disciplines in order to place contemporary developments in per-
spective. 7 The next two sections consist of conceptual and method-
ological critiques of two areas that traditionally have been and still 
remain the principal foci of attention of research psychologists: eye-
witness testimony and the criminal trial process. The Review con-
cludes with some themes culled from experience that capture the 
mood, difficulties, and prospects of applying psychology to the law. 
I. HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 
The interest in psychology and law is not of recent vintage, but 
dates back to the early days of experimental psychology. The intel-
lectual history unfolds in four stages. 
Pioneering Stage (1900s): "Yellow Psycho!ogy"8 
The first area of psycholegal research, as well as the oldest area 
of applied psychology generally, was the study of the reliability of 
witness testimony.9 At the tum of the century, European psycholo-
gists proposed the creation of a "practical science of testimony."10 
The most active expositor became William Stem of Breslau, who 
developed the Aussage or remembrance experiments. 11 Laboratory 
subjects were shown pictures and subsequently asked to recall the 
details through different forms of questioning in a variety of sugges-
was established in 1974. For a survey of these and other institutional developments, see Tapp, 
supra note 3, at 362-70; Tapp, Psychological and Policy Perspectives on the Law: Reflections on 
a lJecade, 36 J. Soc. lssuES 165, 168-72 (1980). 
6. See Loh,Psychologyand Law: A Coming of Age, 24 CONTEMP. PSYCH. 164, 165 (1979). 
7. Despite a long tradition and rapid recent developments, there has not been any system-
atic historical essay or conceptual overview of the field of law and psychology. Summary 
sketches are found in Tapp, supra note 3, at 360-62; Redmount, Psychology and Law, LEOAL 
AND CRIMINAL PSYCHOLOGY 22, 44-50 (H. Toch ed. 1961); and Levine & Tapp, The Ps;•chol-
ogy of Crimina!Ident!fication: The Gap from Wade lo Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1079, 1089-95 
(1973). Efforts at surveying the field have been directed principally to reviewing the empirical 
literature on selected topics. See Tapp, supra note 5, at 169, for citations to recent reviews. 
8. Moore, Yellow Psychology, 11 LAW NOTES 125 (1907). 
9. See A. ANASTASI, FIELDS OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 548 (1964). 
10. Whipple, The Observer as Reporter: A Survey of the "Psychology of Testimony," 6 
PSYCH. BULL. 153 (1909) (quoting A. BINET, LA SUGOESTIBILITE (1900)). A lawyer-criminolo-
gist, Hans Gross of Prague, was another early proponent of the scientific study of testimony in 
his book on KRIMINALPSYCHOLOGIE (1897). 
11. W. STERN, BEITR.AGE ZUR PSYCHOLOGIE DER AUSSAGE (1903). 
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tive contexts. Inaccurate recollection was the norm, and from this 
finding Stem concluded that courtroom witnesses were generally un-
reliable.12 This procedure was later replaced by "reality experi-
ments" designed to simulate more realistically the observation and 
reporting of events. 13 In a typical scenario, a quarrel between two 
students suddenly erupts in the midst of a class session and one of 
them draws a revolver. The instructor then stops the staged incident 
and asks for a description of what occurred from the rest of the class. 
The results uniformly show substantial errors in the recall of almost 
every facet of the event (words spoken, weapon used, etc.), with the 
degree of inaccuracy increasing when the report is elicited by leading 
questions or after a lapse of time since the initial observation. 14 
TheseAussage experiments were used by Stem to evaluate the trust-
worthiness of particular witnesses in German courts, as well as to 
train police officers and judicial officials in the fallibility of cognitive 
processes.15 They have also become the paradigm for current re-
search on eyewitness identification; they are repeated so often that 
the findings are no longer considered novel. 16 
There was initially no indigenous psychology of Aussage in this 
country. 17 Most of the work here merely described or replicated the 
European studies. The first book on the subject in English that in-
troduced American psychologists and lawyers to the continental de-
12. For example, there was a general inclination to exaggerate (three trees in the original 
observation were recalled as a forest), additional items were substituted or created in order to 
add coherence to the remembered picture, and leading questions were found capable of exer-
cising a well-nigh fatal power. See Stem, The Psychology of Testimony, 34 J. ABNORMAL & 
Soc. PSYCH. 3 (1939). 
13. At Stem's suggestion, the first reality experiment was conducted in 1901 in a German 
law school class. See kl. at 10-11. 
14. An averaging across the findings of different studies showed that testimony by free 
narration was the most accurate means of eliciting the initial observation (about 75% accu-
racy). Errors increased substantially when testimony was elicited by leading or suggestive 
questions. See Whipple, supra note 10, at 163-65. 
15. See Stem, supra note 12, at 12. 
16. In a modem version of the reality experiment, the videotape of a mugging was broad-
cast on the nightly news of a major television station in New York City. It was followed by the 
showing of a lineup of six suspects, and viewers were asked to call in with their identification 
of the mugger. Less than 15 percent of the 2000 respondents correctly identified the assailant, 
a rate no better than random selection. Buckhout, Nearly 2000 Witnesses Can Be Wrong, Soc. 
Acr. & L., May 1975, at 7. 
17. That the evaluation of witnesses originated and was better received in Europe than 
here can be explained in part by the differences in adjudication procedures. In an inquisitorial 
system, the judge takes the initiative in su=oning and questioning witnesses, whereas in the 
adversarial system that task is left to the party litigants. Deciding without a jury, the continen-
tal judge is more likely to call on psychological experts for aid in observing and examining the 
trustworthiness of witnesses. In the German courts, for example, psychologists improvised 
face-recognition experiments and attempted to reconstruct the events described by individual 
witnesses. They did not limit themselves to testifying about the unreliability of the human 
senses in general. See Stem, supra note 12, at 14, 18. 
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velopments was written in 1908 by Hugo Miinsterberg, Director of 
the Psychological Laboratory at Harvard University. 18 He summa-
rized the experimental literature bearing on the unreliability of per-
ception and memory, and proposed the use of word-association tests 
to help determine the guilt of the accused in criminal trials. More-
over, he made sweeping claims about the superiority of psychologi-
cal methods to those of law. He scorned the adversary system of 
adjudication as a museum of irrational procedures. With missionary 
zeal, Miinsterberg castigated the legal profession for not embracing 
the new science: 
The time for such Applied Psychology is surely near. . . . The law-
yer alone is obdurate. 
The lawyer and the judge and the juryman are sure that they do not 
need the experimental psychologist. . . . They go on thinking that 
their legal instinct and their common sense supplies them with all that 
is needed and somewhat more. 19 
Lawyers promptly lambasted the "presumptuous little book"20 as 
"yellow psychology."21 In a merciless satire John Wigmore de-
scribed a libel suit brought against Miinsterberg by the legal profes-
sion for injury to its good name.22 Wigmore cross-examined 
Miinsterberg on each of his assertions and found them wanting. The 
satire concluded with the judge finding for the plaintiff and deter-
mining that psychology had nothing to offer to the law at that time.23 
Beneath some of the rhetorical excesses were perceptive criticisms of 
theAussage experiments that are still applicable to current research 
on eyewitness testimony. Wigmore pointed out that the results on 
testimonial accuracy were based on group averages. In a courtroom, 
it is the reliability of a specific witness that is in question, and "[t]he 
new psychology cannot [assess] error of individual witnesses."24 
More importantly, the experiments fail to address the critical legal 
question: "[w]hether the alleged percentages of testimonial error 
. . do really produce misleading results in the verdicts."25 The ulti-
18. ON THE WITNESS STAND (1908). 
19. Id. at 9-11. 
20. H. CAIRNS, LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 169 (1935). 
21. See Moore, supra note 8. 
22. Wigmore, Professor Munsterberg and the Psychology of Testimony: Being a Report of 
the Case of Cokestone v. Munsterberg, 3 ILL. L. REV. 399 (1909). 
23. He pointed out that even among the German psychologists there was no universal 
acceptance of the reliability and validity of the experimental procedures to evaluate witnesses; 
some claimed the results were "defective," "overhasty," and that the "use of psychological 
experiments in trials must be rejected." Id. at 412-13. 
24. Id. at 423. 
25. Id. at 426. 
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mate issue is not the frequency of testimonial errors of witnesses but 
the prejudicial impact, if any, upon the trial outcome. Wigmore pro-
ceeded to conduct his own reality tests in which witnesses testified 
about the staged incident before a jury. The results confirmed his 
hunch that a jury, in the course of deliberation, succeeds in finding 
facts that more accurately reflect what happened than would be ex-
pected from the testimonial errors.26 Nevertheless, since the time of 
Stem and Munsterberg the reliability of witnesses has been "the cen-
tral theme of the psychology of testimony" and has "received by far 
the lion's share of research attention,"27 and with one notable excep-
tion, 28 every subsequent study has regarded the reliability of testi-
mony - rather than of the verdict - as the key adjudicative issue. 
After Wigmore's rejoinder, American psychologists "left the law 
rather severely alone."29 Some disavowed Munsterberg's "extrava-
gances" as "not benefit[ing] science or truth";30 others disparaged as 
"opportunist" any undertaking in applied, as opposed to scientific, 
psychology.31 There followed a period of silence and inaction last-
ing about fifteen years, broken only by some annual reviews of 
Aussage studies and their forensic applications in Europe.32 
Legal Realist Stage (1930s): "Psychologism in the Law"33 
The end of the 1920s and the 1930s saw a revival of interest in 
psychology and law, this time initiated mostly by lawyers. Interest 
was manifested in two directions: toward the application of psychol-
ogy to selected aspects of legal practice, and toward a radical critique 
of substantive legal doctrines and appellate court decision-making 
based on psychology. 
26. See J. WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF 698-701 (1937). 
27. Fishman, Some Current Research Needs in the Psychology of Testimony, 13 J. Soc. 
ISSUES 60 (1957). 
28. Marston, Studies in Testimony, 15 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 5 (1924). 
29. Hutchins, The Law and the Psychologists, 16 YALE REV. 678 (1927). 
30. Moore, The Value of Ps;•chology to the Lawyer, 19 CASE & COMM. 795 (1913). 
31. Titchener, Psychology: Science or Technology, 84 POPULAR Sci. MONTHLY 39, 51 
(1914). 
32. Every year from 1910 to 1917 (except for 1916), Whipple wrote an annual review of 
European developments: Recent Literature on the Psychology of Testimony, 7 PSYCH. BULL. 
365 (1910); The Psychology of Testimony, 8 PsYCH. BULL. 307 (l9ll);PsychologyofTestimony 
and Report, 9 PSYCH. BULL. 264 (1912); Psychology of Testimony and Report, 10 PSYCH. BULL. 
264 (1913); Psychology of Testimony and Report, l l PSYCH. BULL. 245 (1914); Psychology of 
Testimony, 12 PSYCH. BULL. 22 l (1915); Psychology of Testimony, l 4 PsYtH. BULL. 234 (1917). 
Another continental study of note during this period, which served as a model for current 
research (see text following note 138 i'!fra), was by Muscio, The I'!fluence of the Form of a 
Question, 8 BRIT. J. PSYCH. 351 (1916). 
33. Kennedy, Psychologism in the Law, 29 GEO. L.J. 139 (1940). 
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Books appeared that were written by and for attorneys for the 
purpose of presenting "in a practical way the psychological factors 
involved in the practice of law."J4 In Psychology for the Lawyer, for 
example, there were chapters on lie detection, covert suggestion, 
identification of facial and bodily expressions, and the traditional 
subject of testimonial certitude.JS Another volume on Legal Psychol-
ogy consisted, according to its subtitle, of "Psychology applied to the 
trial of cases, to crime and its treatment, and to mental states and 
processes."J6 In an overview entitled Law and the Social Sciences, 
an English lawyer observed that psychology at that time had at-
tracted far more attention from the legal profession than the other 
social sciences.J7 Then as now, the contributions were centered on 
two broad domains, the psychology of the cognitive processes of wit-
nesses, and the psychology of crime and criminal personality. Books 
tended to rely as much on popular psychology as on research data in 
canvassing information useful in lawyering. Only one book of this 
genre was authored 'by a psychologist during this time. In addition 
to covering the conventional subjects, it introduced a new topic for 
study in the measurement of public confusion between similar trade 
names.JS 
Some legal scholars and psychologists sought to revamp the 
whole of legal theory and methodology with the aid of psychology. 
One of the most ambitious and controversial undertakings was by 
Edward Robinson, a psychology professor and law lecturer at Yale 
University. In a book on Law and the Lawyers, he advocated the use 
of the method and viewpoint of science, particularly behaviorist psy-
chology, to salvage jurisprudence from the doldrums of its outdated 
conceptualism. 39 
[l]t will be a fundamental principle of the new philosophy of law, that 
every important legal problem is at bottom a psychological problem 
and that every one of the many traditions about human nature which 
are to be found in legal learning needs to be gone over from the stand-
point of modern psychological knowledge.40 
He urged the substitution of "plain psychological facts"41 for such 
legal concepts as intent, the reasonable person, and stare decisis -
34. D. MCCARTY, PSYCHOLOGY FOR THE LAWER iii (1929). 
35. Id 
36. M. BROWN, LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY {1926). 
37. H. CAIRNS, supra note 20, at 173. 
38. H. BURTT, LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY 424-35 (1931). 
39. E. ROBINSON, LAW AND THE LAWYERS (1935). 
40. Id at 51. 
41. Id at 122. 
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only then would law cease to be "an unscientific science."42 
Predictably, Robinson - like Munsterberg - did not make 
many friends in the legal community. In a scathing review entitled 
"The Jurisprudence of Despair," Phillip Mechem complained that 
Robinson had criticized a straw man of his own making, namely the 
unreasonable lawyer who inhabits a world oflegal fictions and is out 
of touch with reality.43 He further complained that most of the "sci-
entific" psychology relied upon by Robinson consisted of unverified 
theories and unsubstantiated generalizations. Mechem despaired at 
the prospect of waiting for psychology to provide the necessary 
knowledge before allowing law to manage human affairs. 
The rebuff of Mechem and others44 glossed over an important 
contribution of Robinson to the analysis of the role of psychology in 
law. Robinson perceived that the strategy of seeking one-to-one 
linkages between psychological findings and legal problems, charac-
teristic of studies on witness testimony, was bound to end in disap-
pointment. Laboratory results on the fallibility of perception and 
memory simply do not transfer wholesale to the practical task of 
evaluating witness reliability.45 Hence, he "rejected the notion that 
jurisprudence can wait for a collection of psychological laws so defi-
nite and reliable as to be directly applicable to the solution of practi-
cal legal problems."46 This represented a shift in the way the 
relations between the two disciplines had been viewed. Up to then, 
psychologists began by combing through their inventory of informa-
tion and then applying whatever seemed relevant to law and lawyer-
ing. Robinson cast doubt on the immediate utility of available 
psychological learning, and suggested instead a two-step approach: 
First, psychologists should begin with substantive issues of impor-
tance to law -"[i]n the existing legal materials there is a mine of 
data for psychological investigation";47 then, the "interrogatory atti-
tude of psychology"48 should be brought to bear on the behavioral 
premises implicit in legal doctrines. The value of psychology, as he 
saw it, lay not in providing "ready-made"49 answers but in bringing 
to jurisprudence an attitude or point of view about the roie of empir-
· 42. Id. at I. 
43. Mechem, The Jurisprudence of JJespair, 21 low A L. Rev. 669, 676 (1936). 
44. See, e.g., Goodrich, Institute Bards and Yale Reviewers, 84 U. PA. L. Rev. 449, 451-54 
(1936). 
45. See E. ROBINSON, supra note 39, at 112-13, 117. 
46. Id. at 118. 
47. Id. at 120. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 115. 
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ical inquiry. This modest and sensible proposition, embedded as it 
was in his more impassioned diatribes against the conservatism of 
the law, was lost on his legal critics. 
Some of Robinson's colleagues at Yale Law School actually 
heeded the call to apply the psychological viewpoint to specific doc-
trinal issues. Underhill Moore sought to explain inconsistent judicial 
decisions in a banking law problem as arising, not from different 
interpretations of legal rules, but from differences in "institutional 
patterns of behavior" of bankers in the various jurisdictions.50 To 
discover these patterns he observed the day-to-day actions of bank 
employees and their responses to hypothetical problem situations. 
But his series of elaborate studies yielded, according to one critic, 
only "inconclusive" results.s 1 Subsequently, with an experimental 
psychologist, Moore studied the effect of changing traffic ordinances 
on the parking behavior of drivers.52 It was again an heroic effort to 
apply the approach and method of psychology - in this instance, 
the stimulus-response theory of learning - to one tiny comer of the 
law. This time, Moore's effort to assess the law from a rigidly beha-
vioristic approach met with only silence from the legal community.s3 
In another series of studies by Robinson's colleagues, Robert 
Hutchins, a lawyer, and Donald Slesinger, a psychologist, critiqued 
rules of evidence. Their aim, "preliminary to experimental attack, 
[was to analyze] the law of evidence [so as] to make explicit its psy-
chological assumptions and criticize them in the light of those of 
modem psychology."54 These assumptions included rough-and-
ready notions about the memory and mental competency of wit-
nesses, the reliability of excited utterances made under stress 
(thereby rendering them admissible as an exception to hearsay), and 
the validity of the concept of consciousness of guilt.S5 
50. See generally Moore & Hope, An Institutional Approach lo the Law of Commercial 
Banking, 38 YALE L.J. 703 (1929). 
51. Fuller,American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429,433 n.14 (1934). 
52. See generally Moore & Callahan, Law and Learning Theory: A Study in Legal Control, 
53 YALE L.J. l (1943). 
53. Psychologists, however, reacted positively to the study. This was an era during which 
the behavior theory of learning was used to account for all of human conduct. Law was seen 
as behavioral engineering based on learning principles. See Hull, Moore and Callahan's ''Law 
and Learning Theory•~- A Psychologist's Impressions, 53 YALE L.J. 330-31, 337 (1944). A more 
recent effort at explaining legal conduct in terms of Hull's learning theory is found in 
Schwartz, A Learning Theory of Law, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 548 (1968). 
54. Hutchins & Slesinger, Legal Psychology, 36 PSYCH. REV. 13, 13 n.l (1929). 
55. See, respectively, Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence -
The Competency of Witnesses, 37 YALE L.J. 1017 (1928); Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observa-
tions on the Law of Evidence- Spontaneous Exclamations, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 432 (1928); 
Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence- Consciousness of Guill, 77 
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Although these essays may be among the "best informed and 
most intelligent analyses"56 of the psychology of evidence, their sub-
stantive impact on evidence law and psychological research has been 
negligible.57 The "modem psychology" they relied upon for propos-
ing reforms of existing rules consisted as much of untested general-
izations and informed conjecture about human behavior (which 
were no more unimpeachable than the commonsense assumptions 
they sought to replace) as of scientific findings. 58 The experimental 
studies they cited were not originally designed to address evidentiary 
questions, so their extrapolation of the results to the courtroom rep-
resented a big and arguably unjustified leap.59 As one commentator 
put it, they "appropriated, not the facts of psychology, but the 
psychological approach in contemplating problems of law."60 Their 
essays were essentially policy analyses of law based upon tenuous 
propositions61 disguised as rigorous psychological findings. 
Their legacy, which has been all but forgotten today,62 lies in 
U. PA. L. REV. 725 (1929). Others soon followed their footsteps; see, e.g., Gardner, The Percep-
tion and Memory of Witnesses, 18 CORNELL L.Q. 391 (1933). 
56. H. CAIRNS, supra note 20, at 219. 
57. Their proposed changes are not included in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Several of 
their criticisms were again raised in Stewart, Perception, Memory, and Hearsay: A Criticism of 
Present Law and The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REV. I. 
58. This is illustrated in their treatment of memory. The rule on impeachment of memory 
allows wide-open cross-examination on events unconnected to the facts testified to on direct 
examination. Repeated instances of inability to recollect would raise doubt about the witness's 
claimed remembrance of the material issue. The premise is that memory is a unitary factor -
one has either a good or poor memory. Hutchins and Slesinger argued that studies showed 
there is no single "faculty" of memory. Recollection varies depending on the subject matter 
recalled and the passage of time. They proposed that the rule be changed to restrict the scope 
of cross-examination to facts closely connected to the facts of the direct testimony. Hutchins & 
Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence - Memory, 41 HARV. L. REV. 860 
(1928). However, the experimental studies did not unequivocally prove that the different as-
pects of memory were unrelated. Some of the studies showed that individuals differed in recall 
of words, faces, and numbers. Also, some of the empirical assertions made by the authors were 
incorrect, even in the light of the psychology of their day. They assumed, for example, that the 
forgetting curve is constant; in fact, the forgetting rate varies according to the nature of the 
material learned, the method of testing recall, intervening events between the learning and 
testing, and other factors. In any event, none of the studies they cited was originally designed 
to address this evidentiary question. In extrapolating these studies to the legal context, they 
substituted one generalization or informed conjecture for another. 
59. See H. CAIRNS, supra note 20, at 191-98. 
60. Redmount, supra _note 7, at 45. 
61. Plausible but untested empirical generalizations about behavior which lawyers rely on 
(e.g., the reliability of dying declarations or of excited utterances) and which psychologists 
disparage as "unscientific" have been called "fireside inductions." Meehl, Law and the Fireside 
Inductions, 27 J. Soc. IssuES 65 (1971). Meehl argues that psychology has its own fireside 
inductions which are no more "scientific" than those of lawyers. As Justice Frankfurter cau-
tioned, "So we have to be constantly on our guard lest psychology be more unequivocal in her 
wisdom when she speaks to lawyers than when she speaks to psychologists." F. FRANK-
FURTER, LAW AND POLITICS 297 (1939). 
62. None of the four books reviewed here, which include sections on the psychology of 
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their effort to integrate the two disciplines rather than in the sub-
stance of their scholarship. In articulating this approach, Slesinger 
appeared to agree with Robinson that it "is a naive assumption on 
the part of psychologists and lawyers that . . . results exist that can 
be readily applied" to legal issues. 63 He went on to propose: 
[T]he first step in the development of legal psychology should be a 
logical and psychological analysis oflegal situations .... The prelim-
inary analysis is the job of the lawyer and the logician, and the result 
will not be scientific fact, but hypotheses, which, when scientifically 
tested, may become facts. When the analysis is made the student of 
behavior may step in, and not, as in the past, to coordinate the results 
of his study with that of the legal student, but to devise methods of 
investigating the behavioral hypotheses elaborated in a different 
field.64 
For Robinson and Slesinger, the initial question was not "What is 
known in psychology that can be carried over to the legal process?" 
Instead, after analyzing the legal dimensions, the question became 
"What kinds of new research can be done by psychology to illumi-
nate the factual aspects of the legal problems?" In this view, rap-
prochement between the disciplines does not come about by 
coordinating existing psychological findings to legal issues, but by 
conducting afresh investigations tailored to these legal concerns. 65 
In their essays on evidence, Hutchins and Slesinger did not respond 
to their own call to go beyond "coordinating" results to "experimen-
tal attack." The task was left to a later generation. 
The Context of Legal Realism 
The developments in this period should be viewed against the 
evidence, even mention any of the Hutchins and Slesinger articles. The comprehensive survey 
of the empirical literature by Tapp, supra note 3, also fails to cite them. 
63. Slesinger & Pilpel, Legal Psychology: A Bibliography and a Suggestion, 26 PSYCH. 
BULL. 677 (1929). 
64. Id. at 680. 
65. Another psychologist, a contemporary of Slesinger, sought to uncover the reasons for 
the discord between psychologists and lawyers despite their professed interest in collaboration. 
He found no real meeting of the minds: 
The lawyer is not convinced that the psychologist has any comprehension of legal 
problems; the psychologist [sees] the lawyer fumbling blindly ... and rebukes him for 
not drawing freely upon that body of knowledge he has so carefully and laboriously built 
up. 
He placed the responsibility on both sides: the lawyer for his unfamiliarity with psychology 
and the psychologist for his "insensitivity to the lawyer's point of view." The issue was framed 
as follows: 
It is not a question, in short, of replacing legal decisions by psychological analyses . • • 
but rather a problem of gradual assimilation of psychological knowledge by the law when 
and where it is needed, and when and where it is available. 
Powers, Psychology and Law, 32 J. ABNORMAL Soc. PSYCH. 258, 274 (1937). 
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background of the legal realist movement in jurisprudence. This re-
volt against formalism in law was sparked by Justice Holmes's com-
ment in 1898 that "[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been 
experience."66 Formalist jurisprudence conceived oflaw as a closed, 
deductive body of logically ordered rules. Such a view left little 
room for empirical inquiry. Justice Holmes lifted this logical veil to 
consider the role that extra-legal influences such as socioeconomic 
factors, judicial attitudes, and community values play in the shaping 
of judicial decision making. He saw law as part of the processes of 
society, not as an autonomous logical system. The legal realists of 
the 1930s, concentrated at the Yale and Columbia Law Schools, 
went further in portraying law not as "a 'code' . . . but as in first 
essence a going institution, [so that] it opens itself at once to inquiry 
by the non-technician."67 It was in this climate that legal scholars 
began foraging the psychological thickets for applications to their 
craft and social scientists began to be appointed to law faculties. 
Not all realists, however, marched under one flag. The radical 
faction of the movement called for a complete overhaul of formal-
ism. It denied that legal precepts and logical reasoning had any ef-
fect on case law except as after-the-fact rationalizations of 
decisions;68 it elevated emotional experiences and personal history to 
first causes of judicial conduct;69 it repudiated "the heaven of legal 
concepts" based on abstractions and embraced "such positive sci-
ences as . . . psychology."70 The middle-of-the-road faction also 
recognized that judicial decisions were shaped by societal and per-
sonal influences, but nonetheless believed that rules played an eff ec-
tive though limited role in the totality of law.71 
66. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). Another early source of realist inspiration 
was Bingham, What Is the Law? (pt. 1), 11 MICH. L. REV. l (1912). 
67. Llewellyn, The Normative, the Legal, and the Law-Jobs: The Problem of Juristic 
Method, 49 YALE L.J. 1355 (1940). 
68. According to one commentator; a judge does not follow law, but law follows the judi-
cial hunch - emotion and intuition, not reasoning or precedents, control judicial decisions. 
Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 COR· 
NELL L.Q. 274 (1929). Certainty and rationality in the law were dismissed as a "basic myth." 
J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 3 (1930). 
69. "[T]he most salient [feature of the judicial process) is that the decision is reached after 
an emotive experience in which principle and logic play a secondary part." Yntema, The 
Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37 YALE L.J. 468, 480 (1928). "An opinion is but 
the smoke" that covers the underlying psychofogical processes. L. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 
53 (1930). 
70. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 CoL. L. REV. 809, 
821 (1935). Overhaul of the entire legal machinery in light of behavioral psychology was pro-
posed, because "by controlling the individual's environment you can control his character and 
predict his future actions." Beutel, Some Implications of Experimental Jurisprudence, 48 HARV. 
L. REV. 169, 175 (1934). 
71. Llewellyn has been "regarded as the man most representative of the movement as a 
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A major difference between the two groups was the extent of 
their acceptance of the curative powers of psychology. At the time, 
psychology was not an integrated discipline. This was an "era of 
'psychologies,' " of several schools vying each for the title of " 'the 
new psychology.' "72 Some radical realists chose one school, beha-
viorism,73 and accorded it a dominant place in the reform of the ju-
dicial process. These included Robinson and Moore. Others opted 
for the Freudian psychoanalytic school,74 and still others adopted a 
melange ofviewpoints.75 The moderates such as Hutchins and Sles-
inger made use of experimental findings and methods for the better-
ment of legal doctrines, but they did not join the bandwagon of any 
particular psychological school. 76 
It is curious that the radical followers of a jurisprudence that em-
phasized close adherence to empirical facts so cavalierly accepted 
debatable theories. It is also ironic that the two principal theories 
they subscribed to were diametrically opposed in their explanations 
of the causes of conduct. Behaviorism was positivist, acknowledging 
only observable acts as determined by external stimuli; Freudianism 
was subjectivist, focusing on the interplay of unconscious drives and 
conscious restraints. Both were mechanistic conceptions that made 
no accommodation for purposive action and ratiocination as movers 
of behavior. It was this denial of rationalism that appealed to real-
ists intent on exposing the nonrationality of the law. They relied on 
psychology, perhaps not so much as a science, but as an ideology for 
their judicial reform. They replaced the authoritarianism of prece-
dents and rules with dogmatic generalizations from psychological 
theories. They espoused not psychology, but psychologism, in the 
law. Except for some greater legal sophistication, they did exactly 
whole." Fuller, supra note 51, at 430. See generally, Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence -
the Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930). 
72. Dunlap, The Theoretical Aspect of Psychology, in PSYCHOLOGIES OF 1925, at 309 (2d 
ed. C. Murchison 1927). 
73. See Schools of Behaviorism, in id. at 1-8 I. Some went so far as to suggest the study of 
sub-vocal behavior of judges rather than the language of the opinion. See Oliphant,A Return 
to Stare .Decisis (pt. 2), 14 A.B.A.J. 159, 161 (1928). 
74. See, e.g., J. FRANK, supra note 68; Hutcheson, supra note 68. 
75. Thurman Arnold, a co-teacher with Robinson in a class on law and psychology at 
Yale, wrote THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM (1937), which one reviewer described as contain-
ing "a measure of behaviorism, a dash of Gestaltism, a bowing acquaintance with the experi-
mental techniques, a large admixture of psychoanalysis and psychiatry of various brands, and 
a liberal dose of the social psychology of crowds." M. LERNER, IDEAS ARE WEAPONS 208 
(1939). 
76. Others too made pleas for moderation, deploring the extreme psychologism in the law. 
See, e.g., Cohen, Justice Holmes and the Nature of Law, 31 CoLUM. L. REV. 352 (193 I); Pound, 
The Cal/far a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1931). 
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what their law colleagues rebuked Miinsterberg for doing twenty 
years earlier. 
If what psychologists do is to be relevant to lawyers, it needs to 
be marshalled and organized around issues of legal significance. 
Th~s implies a conception or working hypothesis of law to guide the 
choice of issues for investigation and to establish a method of analy-
sis. Realism offered a conceptual alternative to formalism. By em-
phasizing the factual underpinning of rules, the behavioral impact of 
judicial decisions, and the social policies served by law, it invited 
empirical inquiry into law. Such empirical studies as were carried 
out, however, dealt with narrowly circumscribed rules of evidence 
and banking law, or with relatively trivial problems such as parking 
and, later, the writing of bad checks.77 The manifestos and discus-
sions on methodology were kept, for the most part, at a respectful 
distance from actual fact gathering. The bequest of realist jurispru-
dence was the promise rather than the application of its social-legal 
approach to law.1s 
All was quiet on the psychology-law front during the 1940s. 
There were scattered studies on the usual topics of witness testi-
mony,79 evidence rules,80 and criminal behavior,81 and simulations 
of jury decision making were introduced. 82 On the whole, this work 
did not add significantly to what had been done before, and pro-
voked no response from the legal profession. 
77. F. BEUTEL, SOME POTENTIALITIES OF EXPERIMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE AS A NEW 
BRANCH OF SOCIAL SCIENCE (1957). Lamenting that law has developed "nothing new since 
the days of the Roman Empire," Beutel presented an "Experimental Jurisprudence" procedure 
for investigating the impact of legal rules on human conduct. Id at 3. This procedure was 
illustrated with pilot studies on deterring the writing of bad checks. For a sharp rebuttal that 
questions the premise that the social problems addressed by law can be resolved solely on 
bedrock facts gathered by scientific methods, see Cavers, Science, Research, and the Law: Beu-
te/'s "Experimental Jurisprudence", 10 J. LEGAL Eo. 162 (1957). 
78. Realism did have some impact on legal education by broadening the curriculum to 
reflect the interrelation between law and the social sciences. See Britt, The Social Psychology 
of Law, 34 ILL. L. REV. 802, 809-10 (1940); Frank, Why Not a Clinical Law School?, 81 U. PA. 
L. REV. 907 (1933); Hutchins, Legal Education, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 357,366 (1937); Llewellyn, 
On Whal is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 651, 660 (1935);. 
79. Snee & Lush, Interaction of the Narrative and Interrogatory Methods of Obtaining Testi-
mony, 11 J. PSYCH. 229 (1941). See generally Eliasberg, Psychiatric and Psychologic Opinions in 
Court, 39 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 152 (1948); Whitmer, Psychology in Law and Criminol-
ogy, PSYCHOLOGY IN USE (2d ed. J. Gray ed. 1951). 
80. See Britt, The Rules of Evidence -An Empirical Study in Psychology and Law, 25 
CORNELL L.Q. 556 (1940). 
81. See Schmideberg, Psychological Factors Underlying Criminal Behavior, 31 J. CRIM. 
L.C. 458 (1947). 
82. Weld & Roff, A Study in the Formation of Opinion Based Upon 'Legal Evidence, 51 AM. 
J. PSYCH. 609 (1938); Weld & Danzig, A Study of the Way in Which a Verdict is Reached by a 
Jury, 53 AM. J. PSYCH. 518 (1940). 
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Forensic Stage (1950s): Psychologists on the Stand 
Up to this time, legal psychology had been an applied endeavor 
in name only. It had made little direct impact on litigation or judi-
cial decision making. Although psychologists in Europe had served 
as expert witnesses since the tum of the century, 83 and MOnsterberg 
had long exhorted the American judiciary to bestir itself and follow 
suit, it was not until "1950 that [American] psychologists [began] to 
make an appreciable contribution in this role."84 The contribution, 
however, was not by experimental psychologists testifying on witness 
reliability. The era of forensic psychology was ushered in by clinical 
and social psychologists testifying in the areas of mental disorders, 
pretrial publicity, and civil rights. 
Judicial decisions in 194085 and 195486 permitted clinical psy-
chologists with sufficient education and experience to testify as ex-
perts on mental disorders and their causal connections to criminal or 
tortious conduct. 87 The broadening of admissibility of expert psy-
chological testimony occurred during a time of increased profession-
alization (e.g., state certification and licensure), rapid growth of 
mental health professions, and formulation of legal doctrines of in-
sanity consistent with modem psychiatry. 88 An extensive literature 
on the professional and legal aspects of the role of psychologists in 
court suddenly mushroomed. 89 
At the same time, developments in survey research and sampling 
methodology led to applications in litigation,90 particularly to the as-
sessment of the extent of community bias toward a defendant due to 
prejudicial pretrial publicity.91 At first, however, the survey results 
introduced by experts testifying in support of a motion for venue 
83. Stern, supra note 12. 
84. A. ANASTASI, supra note 9, at 564. 
85. People v. Hawthorne, 293 Mich. 15, 291 N.W. 205 (1940). 
86. Hidden v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 217 F.2d 818 (4th Cir. 1954). 
87. See generally Comment, The Psychologist as Expert Witness: Science in the Courtroom? 
38 Mo. L. REV. 539, 544-54 (1979). 
88. See Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), overruled, United States 
v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
89. See, e.g., Louisell, The Psychologist in Today's Legal World (pt. I), 39 MINN. L. REV. 
235 (1955); Louisell, The Psychologist in Today's Legal World (pt. 2), 41 MINN. L. REV. 731 
(1957); McCary, The Psychologisl as an Expert Witness in Court, ll AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 8 
(1956); McCary,A Psychologist Test!fiesin Court, 15 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 53 (1960); Schofield, 
Psychology, Law, and the Expert Witness, ll AM. PSYCHOLOGIST l (1956); Weitz, An Expert 
Witness, 12 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 42 (1957). 
90. See H. BARKSDALE, THE USES OF SURVEY RESEARCH FINDINGS AS LEGAL EVIDENCE 
47-123 (1957). 
9 l. See, e.g. , Woodward, A Scient!fic Attempt to Provide Evidence for a Decision on C/1ange 
of Venue, 17 AM. Soc. REV. 447 (1952). 
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change were usually excluded on grounds of hearsay: the original 
respondents, as well as the survey researcher, were expected to be 
present for cross-examination.92 Trial courts did not reach the real 
issue underlying admissibility - namely, the methodological com-
petence of the survey - until more than a decade later, when the 
Supreme Court broke precedent and reversed a conviction because 
of pretrial publicity,93 and then endorsed the liberal granting of 
venue change requests as a judicial cure for unfavorable media im-
pact.94 
The landmark School Desegregation Cases in 195495 saw the par-
ticipation of social psychologists and other social scientists in their 
most visible and controversial forensic role to date. In several of the 
lower court proceedings, Kenneth Clark, the plaintiff's leading psy-
chological expert, testified to studies that purported to show the 
harmful effects of segregation on children's personality and leam-
ing.96 On the appeal to the Supreme Court, Clark was joined by 
some thirty other distinguished social scientists in appending to ap-
pellant's brief a "Social Science Statement" that summarized the 
available research data on the effects of segregation and the probable 
consequences of desegregation.97 The Court, in holding that "sepa-
rate educational facilities are inherently unequal,"98 found that seg-
regation of school children "solely because of their race generates a 
feeling of inferiority" and "[retards their] educational and mental 
development."99 The "modem authority" for these findings were the 
writings of Clark and others, cited in the now celebrated footnote 
eleven. 100 Social scientists read the opinion as an acknowledgement 
of their impact in constitutional adjudication. "Proof [of wrongful-
ness of segregation]," said Clark, "had to come from the social psy-
chologists." 101 
The reaction from the legal community was swift and caustic. 
Edmond Cahn rightly criticized the methodological shortcomings 
92. Zeise!, The Uniqueness of Survey Evidence, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 322 (1960). 
93. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961). 
94. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). 
95. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
96. Clark, The Social Scientist as an Expert Witness In Civil Rights Litigation, I Soc. PROB. 
5 (1953). 
91. Reprinted as, Appendix lo Appellants' Brief: The Effects of Segregation and the Conse-
quences of Desegregation: A Social Science Statement, 37 MINN. L. REV. 427 (1953). 
98. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
99. 347 U.S. at 494. 
100. 347 U.S. at 494-95 n.11. 
IOI. Clark, Desegregation: An Appraisal of the Evidence, 9 J. Soc. IssuES 1, 3 (1953). 
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and unjustified inferences of Clark's experiments. 102 Moreover, he 
feared that if reliable data were tendered on the issue, the merits 
would be thought to stand or fall with them, so that a change in 
scientific conclusions would force a change in the constitutional find-
ing regarding segregation. He argued, "I would not have the consti-
tutional rights of Negroes - or of other Americans - rest on any 
such flimsy foundation as some of the scientific demonstrations in 
these records." 103 He also dismissed as mere "literary psychology" a 
poll, cited in footnote eleven, showing the nearly unanimous but un-
documented opinions of social scientists on the harmful effects of 
segregation. 104 Other legal critics described the behavioral evidence 
presented in the "Brandeis brief' -like105 Statement as "more social 
than scientific" 106 and "merely corroborative of common sense." 107 
The footnote was seen as no more than a consolation gesture to 
Clark and company for their fidelity to the cause. 
The debate served to ventilate the issues surrounding the role of 
the social sciences in constitutional adjudication. It helped to set the 
stage for contemporary applications in other areas of constitutional 
law-making. The legal critics undoubtedly had the better part of the 
argument in disclaiming any direct impact of the empirical findings 
on the decision itself. If, as the Court said, segregation is "inherently 
unequal," then its wrongfulness is self-evident; the holding repre-
sents a moral judgment not grounded on factual proof. This is not to 
say, however, that the data may not have had an indirect effect on 
the shaping of the final outcome. Even normative conclusions are 
102. In Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529 (1951), rev. sub nom. Brown v. Board of Educ., 
347 U.S. 483 (1954), the second case in the School Desegregation Cases, Clark presented white 
and brown dolls to sixteen black children aged six to nine years in Clarendon County, South 
Carolina, where the trial was held. He found that most of the children identified with and 
preferred the white doll, even though they recognized that the brown doll was more like them-
selves. From this result, Clark inferred that the children had feelings of self-rejection and 
inferiority. The small sample size, the lack of a control group, the debatable inference, and the 
absence of a showing that these negative attitudes, even if properly inferred, were the product 
of school segregation rather than general societal patterns, were pointed out by Cahn, A Dan-
gerous Myth in the School Segregation Cases, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 161-65 (1955). On the 
other hand, the doll study can be viewed as a kind of projective test which communicated the 
pathos of the children's reactions with a force that could not be better captured in a more 
rigorously designed experiment. See R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 330-31 (1976). 
103. Cahn, supra note 102, at 157. 
104. Id. at 161. 
105. The so-called "Brandeis Brief' was first used by Louis Brandeis in Muller v. Oregon, 
208 U.S. 412 (1908), to present social, psychological, and economic information in order to 
establish the reasonableness of social legislation limiting women's working hours, thereby pro-
viding factual support for the presumption of its constitutionality. See generally Doro, The 
Brandeis Brief, II V AND. L. REV. 783 (1958). 
106. Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 75, 105. 
107. Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 430 n.25 (1960). 
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generated by an awareness of the facts; research results can illumi-
nate and sharpen the factual premises of constitutional decision 
making. What was said to have been but common knowledge about 
the psychological consequences of segregation was the product, at 
least in part, of the substantial corpus of research that had accumu-
lated over the years and worked its way into popular learning and 
then into the living law. 
The imprimatur of "modem authority" served other functions as 
well. It added legitimacy to the overruling of a well established doc-
trine that was itself rationalized in terms of the "psychological 
knowledge" 108 of its time. The united front of the social scientists, in 
contrast to that of other scholars, 109 reinforced the image of broadly 
based agreement on the evil of segregation that the Court sought to 
convey in its own unanimous opinion. Another indirect use of the 
empirical contribution was to show the mere possibility of harm re-
sulting from racially discriminatory legislation, thereby shifting the 
burden to the state to come forward and prove that its actions were 
not presumptively unconstitutional. 110 For this procedural objective, 
the Court was wholly justified in accepting the findings with an un-
critical eye. 
The experiences of the forensic stage suggest two ways that psy-
chology can be used in adjudication. 111 One is in the application of 
law, as an aid to judicial fact-finding. In resolving a dispute, a court 
is called upon to apply a rule oflaw (the major premise) to its find-
ings of fact (the minor premise) in order to reach a decision. When 
the rule itself is uncontested and only the facts are in dispute (as in 
cases involving a defendant's mental competency to stand trial or the 
extent of community prejudice that renders unlikely an unbiased ve-
108. The "modem authority" served to discredit the "psychological knowledge at the time 
of Plessy v. Ferguson," Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). Plessy was rooted 
in Social Darwinist ideas about the biological bases of racial attitudes and their impervious-
ness to change by legislation. See Bernstein, Plessy v. Ferguson: Conservative Sociological Ju-
risprudence, 48 J. NEGRO HIST. 196 (1963). 
109. Leading historians were enlisted by both sides to prepare briefs in response to an 
intermediate order by the Court which requested further argument on the intention of the 
framers of the fourteenth amendment regarding public school segregation. Brown v. Board of 
Educ., 345 U.S. 972 (1953) (Miscellaneous Orders). These briefs "must surely have amounted 
to the most extensive presentation of historical materials ever made to the Court." Bickel, The 
Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1955). There 
was, however, no consensus among the historians, and the Court dismissed their materials in 
one sentence: "At best, they are inconclusive." Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 
(1954). Thus, "the Court rejected history in favor of sociology" in footnote eleven. Kelly, Clio 
and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119, 144. 
110. P. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE UNITED STATES 151-52 (1961). 
111. See Greenberg, Social Scientists Take the Stand: A Review and Appraisal of Their 
Testimony in Litigation, 54 MICH. L. REV. 953 (1956). 
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nire) psychological testimony can aid in the determination of the ap-
plicability of the rule. The other use is in the creation of law, as an 
aid to judicial legislation. When both the applicable law and the 
facts are at issue, as they were in the desegregation problem, the 
presentation of behavioral data on the disputed facts can help shape 
judge-made law either directly or indirectly. It is a central feature of 
the nature and growth of law that "[t]he issues of fact arise out of the 
law, but at the point of application of law, the issue of law also arises 
out of the facts." 112 There is a chicken-and-egg relationship between 
law and facts that makes possible the use of empirical research in the 
judicial process. Existing legal rules give facts their legal signifi-
cance, but facts, in tum, can also beget new legal rules. 113 
The Cahn-Clark exchange chilled further enthusiasm by psychol-
ogists for research on law for about a decade. Lawyers and psychol-
ogists went their separate ways, and such work as was done -
mostly by lawyers - simply retread old ground. A 1929 book on 
Psychology for the Lawyer reappeared in retitled and slightly revised 
version. 114 Another attorney urged, as Hutchins and Slesinger had a 
generation earlier, "a complete reconsideration of the rules of evi-
dence to conform them . . . to what we know of the human condi-
tion," but his book offered no reform proposals. 115 A volume on 
case law governing eyewitness identification alluded to psychological 
conditions of suggestiveness, but no empirical research was de-
112. Hart & McNaughton, Evidence and leference in Law, in EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE 
48, 61 (D. Lerner ed. 1959). 
113. Id. at 61. The interrelationship between issues of fact and law suggests a method for 
collaboration between lawyers and psychologists in reform-oriented litigation. In the course of 
identifying the legal issues, a lawyer can indicate to the psychologist the kinds of empirical 
data that might be needed. Legal rules define the types of facts relevant for adjudication. An 
anti-segregation rule might state, for example, that there is wrongful discrimination if there is 
substantial racial imbalance in a school system as a result of deliberate actions by school offi-
cials. It is only when segregation is deemed wrong (a normative judgment embodied in the 
rule) that one needs to inquire about the facts of racial imbalance and official conduct- "The 
issues of fact arise out of the law." Although the initial factual questions for investigation are 
posed by the lawyer, the psychologist does not remain in a handmaiden's role. He may call 
attention to other facts which the lawyer had not considered and which could alter the charac-
ter of the legal issue itself. He might do research that shows that segregated schooling pro-
duces detrimental personality and educational effects on minority children irrespective of 
whether the segregation came about by deliberate action or by fortuitous circumstances. The 
lawyer could use these findings to challenge the existing rule by arguing that these effects are 
sufficient to find unlawful discrimination, without any further showing of improper official 
motive (which may be difficult to prove). Here is an instance of using psychological research 
to help create new law. This is possible because "at the point of application of law, the issues 
of law also arise out of the facts." As Hart and McNaughton state, "[T]he truth is that neither 
[the psychologist nor the lawyer] can be in complete command. They have to learn how to 
work together ... and each having a sense of the other's potential contribution in developing 
the analysis." Id. at 62. 
114. D. McCARTY, PsCHOLOGY AND THE LAW (1960). 
115. J. MARSHALL, LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFLICT (1966). 
March 1981] Psycholegal Research 677 
scribed or undertaken. 116 The first psychology text since realist days 
appeared, entitled Legal and Criminal Psychology .117 It dealt far 
more with "criminal" matters (psychopathic personality, drug addic-
tion, corrections, etc.) than with "legal" ones (e.g., trial tactics and 
psychology of judges). This literature shows that psychology and 
law "mingled only at their peripheries"; the relations were marked 
by "high defensiveness on both sides." 118 In contrast, "genuine 
cross-disciplinary research" 119 between lawyers and other social 
scientists, notably sociologists and political scientists, came to full 
flower during this period. 120 Some of the studies - particularly 
those on jury decision-making, 121 legal socialization, 122 and legal im-
pact 123 (e.g., of school prayer decisions and of insanity doctrines) -
dealt with social psychological subject matter and even relied on so-
cial psychological theories and methods. The irony is that the em-
pirical approach to law advocated by Robinson and other realists 
began to take hold at the time when psychologists withdrew from the 
field. 
The Coming of Age (1970s): New Research on Procedural Justice 
In a 1973 conference, a legal scholar said with remarkable pre-
science that psychology and law would be one of the two "growth 
stocks" in law and the social sciences generally. 124 Since then, more 
psychologists have been doing more empirical research on law-re-
lated matters than in all the preceding years combined. The interest 
was revived in part by the social-political activism of the 1960s, 
which helped shape a generation of social scientists who sought to 
reconcile their training in scientific research with the call of social 
action by engaging in studies that had, in the overused term of its 
116. P. WALL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES (1965). 
117. LEGAL AND CRIMINAL PSYCHOLOGY (H. Toch ed. 1961). 
118. Riesman, Some Observations on Law and Psychology, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 30, 32 
(1951). 
I 19. Ladinsky, The Teaching of Law and Social Science Courses in the United States. 
Working Paper No. 11, Center for Law and Behavioral Science, University of Wisconsin, 
Madison (1975). 
120. This empirical literature is reviewed is Skolnick, The Sociology of Law in America, 
SOCIAL PROBLEMS, Special Summer Supplement (1965). 
121. E.g., Strodtbeck, James & Hawkins, Social Status in Jury Deliberations, 22 AM. Soc. 
REV. 713 (1957). 
122. E.g., J. COHEN, R. ROBSON & A. BATES, PARENTAL AUTHORITY: THE COMMUNITY 
AND THE LAW (1958). 
123. E.g., W. MUIR, PRAYER IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1967); R SIMON, THE JURY AND 
THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY (1967). 
124. Friedman, remarks given in Assessment Conference: Developments in Law and Social 
Sciences Research, 52 N.C. L. REV. 969, 1071 (1974). 
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day, "social relevance." The courts spearheaded changes in civil, 
criminal, and political rights, so that law again became a focus of 
applied research. Three score years after the publication of Miln-
sterberg's book, the field was finally coming into its own. 
The scope of contemporary empirical inquiry has expanded be-
yond the traditional confines of witness testimony and evidence rules 
to encompass a wide variety of topics. 125 There are some common 
themes in this extensive literature that help place the field as a whole 
in perspective. Most, though by no me~ns all, of the research under-
taken today deals with criminal rather than civil justice, with the 
judicial rather than the legislative or administrative sectors of the 
legal system, and with procedural rather than substantive law - in 
essence, the main focus is on the criminal trial process. 
To establish a framework for this Review, it is useful to think of 
this process as comprising four sequential phases: pretrial influences 
(including eyewitness identifications) on the jury; selection of the 
jury; presentation of testimony (filtered through evidence rules) and 
law (via judicial instructions) to the jury; and finally, decision-mak-
ing by the jury. The complex of legal rules that govern each of these 
phases and the values they implicate constitutes procedural justice. 
The centerpiece of this framework of procedural justice is the jury. 
It is the one subject that has commanded the most attention of psy-
chologists in the past ten years. 126 This emphasis is conceptually jus-
tifiable. Although only a minority of cases go to trial and fewer yet 
are heard by a jury, the ideal of using lay members to find facts, to 
interpose the conscience of the community, and to legitimate official 
action is part of the foundation of our system of justice. Much of 
procedural law can only be understood in relation to, and in the con-
text of, the institution of the jury. On the one hand, jurors are re-
garded as "the nerve center of the fact-finding process." 127 On the 
other, there has been a historical distrust in the judgment of ama-
125. For example, the first two books on psycholegal research published during the 1970s 
dealt, respectively, with the new subjects of procedural justice and legal socialization. J. THI-
BAUT & L. WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975) ("lo date 
procedural justice has not been the subject of much, if any, social science research," at 2); LAW, 
JUSTICE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL Issues (J. Tapp & 
F. Levine eds. 1977), reviewed by Saks, On Tapp (and Levine), 77 MICH. L. Rev. 892 (1979). 
126. A review of studies on the jury found that 90% of them were conducted within the 
past fifteen years. S. Penrod, A Study of Attorney and "Scientific" Jury Selection Models 
( 1979) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Department of Psychology, Harvard University), For review 
of this literature, see Gerbasi, Zuckerman & Reis, Justice Needs a New Blindfold: A Review of 
Mock Jury Research, 84 PSYCH. BULL. 323 (1977); Davis, Bray & Holt, The Empirical Study of 
JJecision Processes in Juries: A Critical Review, in LAW, JUSTICE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN 
SOCIETY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL Issues (J. Tapp & F. Levine eds. 1977), 
127. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 545 (1965). 
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teurs who are untutored in legal subtleties and inexperienced in eval-
uating evidence. Consequently, an elaborate web of procedural 
rules has evolved to shield the jury at each phase of the fact-finding 
process from extraneous influences that might bias its decision. 128 
Nevertheless the jury remains the hub that holds together the spokes 
of procedural justice. Directly or indirectly, the jury provides the 
backdrop for empirical study of the criminal process. 
The four books reviewed here provide a fairly representative 
sample of the breadth and quality of current psycholegal research. 
The first two are on eyewitness identification and the next two cover 
the remaining three phases of fact-finding in criminal proceedings. 
II. PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
The two books on eyewitness testimony - by A. Daniel Yarmey, 
Professor of Psychology at the University of Guelph, Ontario, and 
by Elizabeth F. Loftus, Professor of Psychology at the University of 
Washington-represent the first and only volumes by North Ameri-
can psychologists on the subject since the days of Munsterberg. 
Each has unique features, so that they complement more than they 
overlap one another. Yarmey asserts that this is the "most ad-
vanced" area of psychological research and the "most able to make a 
significant contribution to the legal system" (p. 228). To assess how 
the literature measures up to these claims, it is first necessary to place 
the research problem in its legal and historical context. 
An eyewitness' in-court identification of the accused can be high-
ly damaging to the defense because of the weight a jury might attach 
to it. 129 However, such an identification may mean two different 
things. It may mean that the witness recalls seeing the accused at the 
crime scene, or that the witness recalls identifying the accused at a 
lineup or photographic identification session at the police sta-
tionhouse. In the first instance, the reliability of the initial observa-
tion is subject to the inherent frailties of perception, memory, and 
recall. In the second, police pressures to make a positive identifica-
tion may be a situationally induced source of bias. In either case, if 
the defense is unsuccessful in impeaching the eyewitness' testimony 
by showing the unreliability of the observation and/or the prejudi-
cial police influence, the outcome of the trial may well be determined 
in advance. 
128. J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 47 
(1898). 
129. "The fact is that juries do not recognize its [eyewitness testimony's] unreliable na-
ture ..•. " G. WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF GUILT 119-20 (3d ed. 1963). 
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In the Supreme Court's first major attempt to confront the "dan-
gers inherent in eyewitness identification and the suggestibility in-
herent in the context of the pretrial identification," 130 it noted that 
this type of evidence " 'accounts for more miscarriages of justice 
than any other single factor.' " 131 Although the lineup was held to 
be a critical stage at which suspects had a right to counsel, the Court 
retreated a few years later and limited the right to post-indictment 
lineups. 132 Even the presence of counsel at the lineup, however, does 
nothing to detect or alleviate any unreliability in the original obser-
vation at the crime scene. Absent the right to counsel, the validity of 
a pretrial identification is determined by the totality of circum-
stances: it must be both unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to 
misidentification before it violates due process. 133 
The psychology of eyewitness testimony represents the conver-
gence of three research traditions. One is the early Aussage experi-
ments that demonstrated the fallibility of the cognitive processes and 
provided the methodological prototype for current studies. A second 
tradition is basic experimental research on perception and memory 
during the past fifty years. A classic study of remembering in 1932 
showed that it is a constructive rather than reproductive process: in-
stead of simply storing and retrieving information, it is "an e_fforl 
after meaning." 134 Subsequent research elaborated the idea that the 
mind is not a mirror that merely reflects the external world, but 
rather a dynamic process that creates its own vision of reality. A 
third intellectual source is the studies of social perception and social 
psychology since 1950. 135 These studies took into account, as earlier 
experimental psychology had not, the social setting in which percep-
tion operates. The studies described the motivational bases of per-
ception and the processes of conformity to social influence. Yarmey 
and Loftus have pulled this extensive research literature from differ-
130. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 235 (1967). Wade was decided together with 
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). 
131. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 229 (1967) (quoting WALL, supra note I 16, at 
26). The possibility of misidentifications by eyewitnesses has also been discussed by commen-
tators. See Levine & Tapp, supra note 7, at 1081; E. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT 
(1932); Comment, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Perceptions, 82 DICK. L. REV. 465, 467 
(1978). 
132. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972). 
133. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112-16 (1977). See generally N. SOBEL, EYEWIT• 
NESS IDENTIFICATION: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS§ 37 (1972 & Supp. 1980), 
134. F. BARTLETT, REMEMBERING: A STUDY IN EXPERIMENTAL AND SOCIAL PSYCHOL• 
OGY 44 (1932). 
135. Eg. , Asch, Effect of Group Pressure upon the Mod!fication and Distortion of Judgments, 
in READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 174 (3d ed. E. Maccoby, T. Newcomb & E. Hartley eds. 
1958); Bruner, Social Psychology and Perception, in id. at 185. 
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ent specialities of psychology together into a coherent whole and ap-
plied it to the problem of eyewitness identification in criminal cases. 
Yarmey's The Psychology of Eyewitness Testimony 
Directed to lawyers and psychologists, this book is an "integrated 
account of our knowledge of the psychological and legal aspects of 
eyewitness identification" designed to "show the relevance and im-
plications for the criminal justice community of the scientific litera-
ture" (p. xiii). 
It begins with an attempt to "place psychology in relationship to 
law" (p. 15). Although both disciplines deal with the same subject 
matter, the control of behavior, law has been "indifferent or even 
hostile" to psychology (p. 6). Y armey places the responsibility on 
both sides equally. He cites approvingly the view that psychologists 
have been " 'ideologically tendentious and often completely unin-
formed with respect to the law' " (p. 16); on the other hand, he be-
lieves lawyers guard the courts as their private preserve and 
"subconsciously resent the entry of [other] experts" (p. 32). To sur-
mount the "communication gap" (p. 33), he presents an overview of 
how the police and the courts operate that places eyewitness testi-
mony in its legal context. Oddly, however, there is no discussion at 
all of stationhouse identifications and their effect on guilt determina-
tion at trial. Instead, the overview describes police field interroga-
tions and the use of probability theory to quantify burdens of proof, 
neither of which seems to bear any relation to the subject of the 
book. 
The major portion of the book, and its principal contribution, 
consists of a systematic exposition of the principles and research 
findings of cognitive psychology. Integrating a wide-ranging litera-
ture, Yarmey lucidly describes the effects of motivation and learning 
on perception, the different components of memory, and the social 
context of perception. He also examines specialized topics such as 
the remembering of faces and the cognitive processes of the young 
and the aged. 136 
Although this exposition is informative and well presented, the 
legal reader eventually begins to wonder about the implications of 
the assemblage of theories and data for eyewitness identification. It 
is not until more than halfway through the book, in a meager eight 
136. The book also includes a chapter (eight) on various topics pertaining to the trial pro-
cess: the order of presentation of evidence, the effectiveness of judicial instructions on the jury, 
the use of the polygraph, and so on, which are not connected to the main subject on eyewitness 
testimony. This chapter, therefore, is excluded from this Review. 
682 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 79:659 
pages (pp. 152-59), that an attempt is made to join the psychological 
research with the legal issues. After a review of the 1967 trilogy of 
Supreme Court cases, Yarmey states that there has been considera-
ble subsequent legislative reform of lineup procedures, but then dis-
misses the procedures as "beyond our scope of interest" (p. 153). 
Since the Court itself has suggested that legislation or police regula-
tions which eliminate the risk of suggestions at lineups might "re-
move the basis for regarding the stage as 'critical,' " 137 one would 
have thought that empirical evaluation of these new procedures 
would be one of the most interesting areas of applied research. 
There is also no mention of post-1967 decisions which have changed 
significantly the legal dimensions of the problem. Instead, Yarmey 
devotes attention to the unreliability of pretrial identifications. 
"What still needs emphasis and discussion . . . is the unwarranted 
trust that police officers, jurors, and the courts persist in giving to 
lineups and eyewitness identifications" (p. 153). Based not on any 
·direct studies but on extrapolation from cognitive research generally, 
he asserts that "mistaken identity from lineups is often the rule and 
not the exception" (p. 159). He fails to discuss what could be done to 
mitigate the risk of error or what alternatives the law could pursue. 
The implication appears to be that this type of evidence should be 
excluded entirely, although Yarmey never explicitly says so, perhaps 
because it is an obviously unrealistic option. 
The book's purpose of presenting an integrated account of mod-
em cognitive psychology is admirably attained. The same cannot be 
said about the related purpose of showing cognitive psychology's le-
gal relevance and implications for eyewitness identifications. 
Yarmey says that "[t]he most important contribution that psychology 
can make to legal decision making is to provide scientific informa-
tion that would not ordinarily be available to the law" (p. 35). How-
ever, as Slesinger stated back in the realist days, it is not enough 
simply to come forward with basic psychological knowledge and 
hope that somehow lawyers will grasp its legal significance. 138 Un-
derstanding of how cognitive processes function does not readily 
translate into practical decision making, any more than knowledge 
of only the physical and chemical properties of clay enables a sculp-
tor to do better modeling. Beyond educating lawyers about the falli-
bility of the senses, assuming that they are uninformed about this 
fact of human experience in the first instance, there remains the basic 
137. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 239 (1967). 
138. See text at notes 63-64 supra. 
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empirical and policy question in this area: what can and should be 
done about potentially erroneous eyewitness identifications? 
Y armey does not address it, but Loftus attempts to face it head on. 
Loftus's Eyewitness Testimony 
Loftus's objectives are the same as Yarmey's: to integrate a di-
verse empirical literature and to show "how this body of research 
should be fitted into . . . the legal system" (p. xiii). She uses the 
"universally accepted" three-step sequence of cognition - acquisi-
tion, retention, and retrieval- as the means of conceptual organiza-
tion (p. 21). Evidence law, too, recognizes these three processes 
when it prohibits hearsay and requires that a declarant be present in 
court so that his perception, memory, and narration can be tested by 
cross.:-examination. 
Eyewitness testimony portrays the mind as a malleable and con-
structive process rather than as a mechanical unit that records and 
faithfully reproduces the original event. Acquisition of information 
by perception is shaped by situational conditions (e.g. , exposure 
time) and subjective influences (e.g., stress, cultural expectations). 
Once the information is encoded and stored, it can be manipulated 
externally to create a new "memory" and thereby distort subsequent 
recollection. In a series of ingenious e*"periments, Loftus demon-
strated how the phrasing of a question c~n subtly alter the original 
information by introducing nonexistent events. After seeing a film 
of a car accident, some subjects were asked to estimate the speed of 
the cars when they "smashed," and others were asked the same ques-
tion when they "hit." A week later, all were asked if they saw bro-
ken glass at the accident scene. The "smashed" subjects were much 
more likely to respond affirmatively, even though there was none in 
the film. Thus, memory is malleable and consists of a combination 
of the original perception with subsequent information acquired 
during the retention phase. To enhance testimonial accuracy, Loftus 
recommends that police and attorneys "should do whatever possible 
to avoid the introduction of 'external' information into the witness's 
memory" (p. 78). 
Likewise, the mode of retrieval can affect remembering. In other 
studies on the influence of wording of questions on testimony, Loftus 
found that subjects who were asked how fast the cars in the film were 
going when they "smashed," "collided," "bumped," "hit," or "con-
tacted" each other gave the following average estimates, respectively, 
in miles per hour: 40.8, 39.3, 38.1, 34.0, and 30.8 (p. 96). The impli-
cation is that out-of-court statements can be shaped by the choice of 
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words used in questioning. Unless the questions are known in addi-
tion to the answers, it would be difficult later at trial to evaluate the 
reliability of the testimony. It is precisely for this reason that evi-
dence law requires the presence of the declarant so that cross-exami-
nation can probe the testimony for possible distortion. 
The two books go well together. Yarmey's review of the litera-
ture is more eclectic, canvasses a broader swath, and places greater 
emphasis on the acquisition stage. Loftus's review focuses more on 
the retention and retrieval phases, with her own original experiments 
receiving the particular attention they deserve. Whereas Y armey de-
votes relatively little coverage to the legal aspects of eyewitness iden-
tification, nearly one third of Loftus's book pertains to them. 
She begins with an overview of all the principal Supreme Court 
decisions on the subject, and then suggests how psychological meth-
ods can be used in analyzing sources of bias in corporeal and photo-
graphic lineups. She concludes that eyewitness testimony is 
unreliable and considers four possible remedies. 139 First, outright 
exclusion is rejected as an impractical and too drastic option, espe-
cially since the trend of modem evidence law is toward greater ad-
mission.140 Second, she finds a corroboration requirement defective 
because, like an exclusionary rule, it transforms an issue of weight 
into one of admissibility. Third, she professes doubt as to the effi-
cacy of cautionary jury instructions, although she cites no empirical 
basis (somewhat unusual for an experimentalist) for her skepticism. 
The fourth and most viable option, according to Loftus, is expert 
psychological testimony. The general constraints on expert testi-
mony141 - qualified expert, proper subject matter, accordance with 
generally accepted explanatory theory, and probative value out-
weighing prejudice - are said to apply to a psychologist's opinions 
on eyewitness testimony. Ultimately, admission of expert psycholog-
ical testimony lies within the trial court's discretion, and Loftus ac-
knowledges that, to date, it has been excluded more often than it has 
been permitted (p. 199).142 
139. Loftus's discussion relies principally on Note, l}id Your Eyes l}eceive You? Expert 
Psychological Testimony on the Unreliabilityef Eyewitness Ident!fication, 29 STAN. L. REV. 969 
(1977). 
140. "[T]he distinct tendency of the Federal Rules of Evidence is to admit rather than 
exclude." I WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE ~ 105(02] (1980). FED. R. EVID. 402 provides that "All 
relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided." 
141. These principles were outlined in the leading case of United States v. Amaral, 488 
F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1973), holding that the exclusion of expert psychological testimony 
on the effects of stress on perception was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion. 
142. See also Note, supra note 139, at 1012. 
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Elsewhere, Loftus and others specializing in eyewitness identifi-
cation concede that "the research has not had a great impact" on the 
judicial process. 143 The law has not ruled eyewitness identifications 
inadmissible; it has not required sua sponte delivery of cautionary 
instructions;144 it has rejected expert testimony on such makeshift 
reasons as trespassing on the province of the jury. More than a gen-
eration ago, Robinson also noted that "[p]sychologists have ~ot been 
called in any numbers to assess the credibility of witnesses." 145 De-
spite the advances of cognitive psychology as a science, its applica-
tions to legal testimony seem to have remained unchanged. Loftus, 
like Yarmey, suggests that one reason is the unavailability of pub-
lished summaries of research for the legal community. Others attri-
bute the lack of impact to the "reactionary and closed-minded" 
nature of the legal system, 146 which suggests that the chapter on yel-
low psychology is not over. But the differences between the two dis-
ciplines on eyewitness identification are too persistent and pervasive 
to be explicable only on these grounds. Loftus's otherwise valuable 
contribution terminates prematurely with the_ call for more liberal 
admission of expert testimony. That is psychological whistling in the 
judicial wind. Instead, it is necessary to delve into more substantial 
reasons that go to the crux of the difficulties of applying psychology 
to the law. This Review of the psychology of eyewitness testimony 
will conclude with a brief analysis of two such interrelated reasons: 
psychological research has not dealt with issues relevant to the poli-
cies behind the law; and there are basic differences between the two 
disciplines in the kinds of information they gather and in the meth-
ods by which they are gathered that place limits to their rapproche-
ment. 
The Legal Impact of Eyewitness Research 
The principal message that emerges from the long history of eye-
witness research is the general fallibility of the witness. 147 The infre-
143. Wells, Applied Eyewitness-Testimony Research: System Variables and Estimator Vari-
ables, 36 J. PERSONALITY Soc. PSYCH. 1546, 1547 (1978), citing unpublished papers by E. 
Loftus, R. Buckhout, and others. 
144. See United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (No error in failing to 
give sua sponte cautionary instructions on fallibility of eyewitness identification in absence of 
request by defense counsel, but a model instruction was nonetheless set forth with the caution 
that failure to adopt it or its equivalent would "constitute a risk [of reversal] in future cases." 
469 F.2d at 557.) 
145. E. ROBINSON, supra note 39, at 98. 
146. Wells, supra note 143, at 1547 (quoting R. Buckhout). 
147. Other contemporary writers in addition to Loftus and Yarmey have reiterated this 
theme. According to Saks and Hastie, "We have emphasized the unreliability of eyewitness 
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quently stated but strongly implied corollary is that eyewitness 
evidence results in mistaken convictions. It is impossible to deter-
mine reliably the incidence of this cause-and-effect relationship, but 
the anecdotal reports 148 on which this implication is based need to be 
placed in perspective. It is improbable that such miscarriages of jus-
tice are a common outcome in criminal prosecutions. Only about 
ten percent of cases nationwide go to trial, 149 and in most of these the 
identity of the perpetrator is not in issue. 1so It is estimated that eye-
witness evidence is used in only five percent of criminal trials. 1s1 
Even when identity is contested, most are not "pure identification" 
cases that rest solely on eyewitness testimony. 1s2 It is no coincidence 
that in all of the identification cases decided by the Supreme Court 
there has been ample circumstantial or other evidence to connect the 
defendant with the crime, apart from the identification testimony. 
Wrongful convictions tend to generate headline attention out of pro-
portion to their actual incidence. While this is not to underplay the 
seriousness of the problems posed by the use of eyewitness testi-
mony, it does suggest that proposals for preventive or remedial 
measures should not be more drastic than what the ill requires. 
One should also recognize the methodological limitations of eye-
witness research. Studies on eyewitness identification uniformly re-
veal low accuracy rates, from which is inferred that actual 
eyewitnesses in real life situations are probably as inaccurate as the 
experimental subjects. However, it is likely that inaccuracies in the 
simulated setting are inflated because of the procedure used. In the 
real world, witnesses who agree to attempt a station-house identifica-
testimony." P. 190. Levine and Tapp concluded that there is "ample justification for regard-
ing all eyewitness identifications with skepticism." Levine & Tapp, supra note 7, at 1124. 
148. The opinions, legal commentary, and psychological sources all rely on selected case 
histories. Commonly cited are F. FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI (1927), 
and E. BORCHARD, supra note 13 I. Systematic data on wrongful convictions due to misiden-
tification do not exist. 
149. Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 23 (5th ed. 
1980). 
150. Most crimes are property crimes (burglaries, auto thefts, etc.) in which proof of iden-
tity is seldom by eyewitness. Personal crimes (assaults, homicides) typically involve parties 
who are acquainted with each other. It is in robberies that the use of eyewitness identification 
is most prevalent. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 230 (1967). 
151. See N. SOBEL, supra note 133, at 4. 
152. Most are "identification plus" cases where circumstantial or other kinds of evidence 
are available. The incidence of "pure identification" cases is thought to be "rare." N. SOBEL, 
supra note 133, at 11. Recently, an analysis of every single criminal case involving a lineup in 
England and Wales during 1973 was conducted. 45% of the suspects in the 2,116 cases were 
identified at the lineup. Of these, only 347 (or about 16% of the total number) were "pure 
identification" cases, and nearly three fourths resulted in convictions. P. DEVLIN, REPORT TO 
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT OF THE DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE 
ON EVIDENCE OF IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 162 (1976). 
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tion are self-selected. For example, if twenty persons are at a bank 
when a robbery occurs, only four or five might agree to view a 
lineup. It is possible that only those who really got a good look at 
the robber would come forward. In contrast, in a staged crime in a 
classroom, all of the students are asked to describe the incident and 
the suspect. The accuracy scores in reality experiments consist of 
averages of the reports of the entire sample of subjects, irrespective 
of whether they were paying attention or napping. If the studies in-
cluded only those students who said they watched the entire incident 
carefully, the reported accuracy rate would probably rise substan-
tially.153 Indeed, one commentator notes that "low accuracy may be 
preferred among researchers."154 Inaccurate identifications speak 
for themselves, but accurate ones require explanation or have to be 
discounted. 
The subject of eyewitness identification can be approached from 
three cognate levels of analysis. The first is the psychological level: 
the sources, nature, and magnitude of the unreliability inherent in 
identifications. The second is the social psychological level of com-
munication and influence: the impact of the testimony on the jury's 
verdict. And the third is the system level: the institutional proce-
dures designed by the law to safeguard the jury against these biasing 
effects. A main reason why the legal applications of psychological 
research have been limited is that psychology and law have each 
given primary attention to different levels of the subject. 
Reality experiments have focused on the psychological level, on 
demonstrating the fallibility of observation and recall. The history 
of the research is one of "show and tell" - show the existence of 
bias of subjects in the laboratory, and tell the legal community about 
the inference that eyewitnesses in the real world are unreliable. 
But the legal community has not been preoccupied with this level 
of analysis. 155 One reason is that particularized proof rather than 
153. Furthermore, at the time of the unexpected incident in the classroom, students may 
not realize it is staged. Later, however, when they are asked to describe it, they know it was 
"only an experiment." Knowledge that this was not a real crime may lead subjects to make 
guesses, which they might not do if real consequences ensued from their identifications. 
154. Wells,supra note 143, at 1552. Wells notes that researchers tend to choose as confed-
erates for staged events those persons who have no distinctive characteristics in order to make 
identifications as difficult as possible. This kind of research led another psychologist to con-
clude, with respect to the studies on the reliability of witness testimony in criminal trials gener-
ally (and not limited to eyewitness identifications), that psychologists tend "to oversell the legal 
implications of their work and ... expect their findings to be regarded as virtual saviors of the 
integrity of the legal system. In fact, these findings tended to be too vague and inconclusive to 
have any practical value." Greer, Anything But the Truth? The Reliability of Testimony in 
Criminal Trials, 11 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 131, 142 (1971). 
155. The Wade trilogy, for example, made only passing reference to the psychological 
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general proof is required in adjudication. "[I]t is not enough," Wig-
more said, "to realize empirically that there are possibilities of error 
in testimonial evidence, and to adopt an attitude of caution. It is 
desirable to learn, if we can, how extensive are the possibilities of 
error."156 Even if such measurements of error were possible, they 
"would be true in general only, and would still not be usable to diag-
nose the individual witness." 157 The law cannot assume that because 
eyewitnesses in general are fallible, a particular eyewitness is mis-
taken too. At present, expert psychological testimony can only point 
to factors that are known to be potentially biasing. Loftus admits 
that "any psychologist who attempted to offer an exact probability 
for the likelihood that a witness was accurate would be going far 
beyond what is possible" (p. 200). Yet because this is precisely the 
judgment that the fact-finder is called upon to make, expert psycho-
logical testimony is of little assistance. 
The real point of contention between psychology and law is not 
the fact of eyewitness fallibility as such, but the purported impact of 
the supposedly fallible testimony upon the ultimate outcome of the 
trial - that is, at the social psychological level of analysis. Psychol-
ogists assume that this testimony fatally taints the verdict. However, 
as early as 1909, Wigmore questioned whether the testimonial errors 
found in laboratory experiments produced incorrect jury verdicts. 
He proposed that "[t]he way to answer this is to include a jury (or 
judge of facts) in the experiment, and observe whether the findings 
of fact follow the testimonial errors or whether they succeed in 
avoiding them and in reaching the actual facts." 158 Of the dozens of 
eyewitness identification studies conducted since then, only Wig-
more's own reality experiments159 and a major study by a psycholo-
gist-lawyer in 1924160 have assessed the impact on the fact-finder. In 
general, these results showed that "[t]he findings ... tend[ed] to 
have a lower rate of errors than the average testimonial rate; ie., 
somehow the testimonial errors [were] correctly adjusted (in part) by 
the judge's or jury's reflection."161 (Neither Yarmey's nor Loftus's 
sources of misidentification and emphasized instead the bias arising from police suggestive-
ness. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
156. J. W1GM0RE, supra note 26, at 692 (emphasis in original). 
157. Id 
158. Wigmore, supra note 22, at 426. 
159. J. W1GMORE, supra note 26, at 698-701. 
160. See Marston,supra note 28, at 6-31, reproduced in part in J. WIGMORE,supra note 26, 
at 710-20. · 
161. J. W!GM0RE, supra note 26, at 720. 
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books nor other current psychological reviews 162 on eyewitness testi-
mony even mention these studies.) These early studies are not in-
consistent with the Kalven and Zeise! study's conclusion that the 
jury is not as incompetent and unreliable as supposed. 163 The bur-
den of persuasion therefore rests with those psychologists who as-
sume that eyewitness evidence, because of its demonstrated fallibility 
in the laboratory, has a greater distorting effect on the jury's decision 
than other kinds of evidence of suspect reliability. 
To put the problem simply, psychological writings equate poten-
tial bias (general fallibility) with actual bias (mistaken verdict). The 
law distinguishes the two. The due process test for evaluating eye-
witness identifications states the two elements in the conjunctive: the 
identification set has to be suggestive and it has to result in misiden-
tification.164 The law's reluctance to assume categorically a one-to-
one correspondence between the potential unreliability (which is 
conceded) and its actual impact in a particular trial (which must be 
proved) is one reason why the courts have not rushed to embrace 
expert psychological testimony. 
Since the law can do little about the fallibility of the senses as 
such (other than recognize it), it has instead devised institutional 
means to counteract the possible effects of fallible testimony on the 
jury's decision. It has required the presence of counsel at post-in-
dictment lineups, reiterated its trust in cross-examination as an in-
strument to expose bias, recommended the drafting of legislation 
and regulations to govern identification procedures, proposed model 
cautionary instructions, and so on. In contrast, psychological re-
search has largely neglected the system level where its applications 
would be of greatest use to law. Instead of continuing to demon-
strate in the laboratory the inaccuracy of perception and recall and 
to bewail the futility of eyewitness testimony, psychologists need to 
concentrate on system level research. 165 There have been virtually 
162. E.g., Wells, supra note 143. 
163. They found that in about three fourths of the cases, the judge and the jury agree on 
the verdict. Although they did not analyze eyewitness cases separately, it does not seem likely 
that jury decisions would be more "mistaken" (as measured by divergences from bench deci-
sions) with identification evidence than with other complex, circumstantial evidence. H. 
KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 56 (1966). 
164. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977). 
165. Wells, supra note 143, at 1548, has distinguished between applied research on "esti-
mator variables" and "system variables." The former refer to variables that cannot be con-
trolled or manipulated in the real world, such as a defendant's physical characteristics or the 
severity of a crime. The effects of such variables on the outcome of a case can only be esti-
mated by research. The latter refer to variables that are susceptible to control, such as the 
structure of a lineup. Most of the applied psychological research has been on estimator vari-
ables and, in general, has had little practical utility for the criminal justice system. 
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no investigations on the adequacy of existing police regulations on 
lineups, or the efficacy of cautionary instructions, or the impact of 
different kinds of eyewitness identification upon the jury. Since the 
publication of her book, Loftus has begun simulation studies on the 
effect of expert psychological testimony on the jury's verdict. 166 The 
purpose is to test the claim, made in excluding such testimony, that 
scientific experts unduly influence the jury. This is the kind of re-
search that holds promise for legal policy. 167 
The difference in levels of analysis is related to a basic difference 
in the methods of inquiry of psychology and law. Experimental re-
search gathers aggregate data and uses statistical measures of central 
tendency and variation. This approach is suited for dealing with 
large numbers of cases. Trial adjudication is designed to investigate 
and determine the facts of a specific case. It is a "clinical" procedure 
that seeks particularized information of a single instance. The ex-
perimental method is designed to secure "legislative facts" - facts 
about broad social, economic, or behavioral phenomena that can be 
relied upon in the creation of new law and policy. The trial process 
is intended to gather "adjudicative facts" - facts that explain who 
did what, when, where, how, and with what motive in a given 
case. 168 
Since the 1950s, expert testimony by clinical psychologists re-
garding a defendant's mental state or a witness's testimonial compe-
tence has raised only questions of weight, not of admissibility. The 
clinician does not testify about the conditions that bring about 
mental disorder in general; he gives his opinion about the sanity or 
competence of the particular defendant or witness at that trial. The 
166. Loftus, Impact of Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of E_rewitness 
ldent!ftcation, 65 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 9 (1980). 
167. In trying to safeguard the judicial process from the possible effects of human bias, 
whether arising from fallible eyewitnesses or other sources such as partial jurors, the law has 
always focused on the system rather than the individual level of analysis. For example, to 
assure an impartial jury, the law does not inquire into the state of mind of individual venire-
men. There are virtually no legal standards to regulate inquiries about a person's biases at voir 
dire. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 303 (1965) (peremptory challenges based on race are not 
a denial of equal protection); Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976) (trial judge's refusal to 
allow voir dire questioning about racial bias upheld because it had no nexus with the trial 
issues). Instead, the law regulates the procedures governing the selection and composition of 
the venire, to ensure that it constitutes a representative cross-section of the community. See 
note 170 i,ifra. Thus, control for impartiality is exerted at the system level, not at the psycho-
logical level. If psychological research is to have an impact on the judicial process, it too must 
focus on the system level. In the area of jury impartiality, psychologists have already shifted to 
this level in trying to improve the voir dire process by "scientific" jury selection. See text at 
notes 170-71 i,ifra. In the area of eyewitness testimony, research on system level variables is 
barely beginning. In this respect, it cannot be said, as Yarmey believes, that eyewitness testi-
mony represents the "most advanced" area of psycholegal research. P. 288. 
168. See 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE§ 15.03 (1958). 
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experimental psychologist, in contrast, does not have the where-
withal to test the reliability of any particular eyewitness. In testify-
ing about human fallibility in general, he is offering legislative facts 
to a fact-finder charged with an adjudicative task. 
Expert testimony by social psychologists in the School Desegre-
gation Cases did not raise admissibility issues. Although the subject 
of their testimony - the effects of segregation on the personality and 
learning of black children in general, and not of the particular chil-
dren in the lawsuit - rested on legislative facts, the courts treated 
them more like clinical than experimental psychologists. The issue 
of school desegregation had societal implications that transcended 
the immediate interests of the litigants; the courts were engaged not 
only in adjudication but also in judicial legislation. Since matters of 
broad social policy were at stake, the experimental data and general-
izations presented by Kenneth Clark and others at least suggested 
the direction the law should take and helped clarify the factual basis 
of the normative issues. No such legislative-type determinations are 
involved in evaluating the testimonial certitude of any given eyewit-
ness. Expert testimony about general results is unhelpful in purely 
adjudicative cases, 169 and this may be why experimental psycholo-
gists have found the courts less receptive to them than to their other 
psychological brethren. 
Ill. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL PROCESS 
The next two books cover a broad range of topics pertaining to 
the criminal process, but they primarily discuss social psychological 
research on jury selection, jury decision-making, and presentations 
of evidence and law to the jury. Social Psychology in Court is co-
authored by Michael J. Saks, Associate Professor of Psychology at 
Boston College, and Reid Hastie, Associate Professor of Psychology 
at Harvard. The Criminal Justice System and Its Psychology is by 
Alfred Cohn and Roy Udolf. Both hold the position of Associate 
Professor of Psychology at New College of Hofstra University; the 
latter is also a member of the New York Bar. 
Saks and Hastie's Social Psychology in Court 
"This text," the authors say, is "a veritable catalog of social sci-
ence research conducted in the courtroom or in simulated, mock-
courtroom settings" (p. 3). One might substitute "the criminal court-
169. See generally Robbins, The Admissibility of Social Science Evidence in Person-Oriented 
Legal Adjudication, 50 IND. L.J. 493, 495-99 (1975). 
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room," because civil proceedings are excluded from its scope. 
Targeted for undergraduates, law students in trial practice courses, 
and attorneys, it attempts to "illuminate the behavior of the actors in 
the courtroom setting and even suggest ways to improve the trial 
process" (p. 1 ). After opening with an overview of the stages in a 
criminal prosecution, the book is organized in terms of the principal 
actors: there are chapters on the judge, jury, lawyer, defendant, and 
"evidence" (I.e., the eyewitness). The chapters most effectively inte-
grating law and social psychology, and likely to be of greatest inter-
est to a legal readership, are those on jury selection, jury decision 
making, and eyewitness testimony. This Review will concentrate on 
the jury materials. 
Saks and Hastie discuss two applications of empirical research to 
jury selection. The first concerns the representativeness of the venire 
drawn from the eligible population. The authors begin by setting 
forth the constitutional dimensions of the problem. The sixth 
amendment guarantees the right to an "impartial jury" that reflects a 
cross-section of the community, and the fourteenth amendment 
equal protection clause forbids the purposeful exclusion or under-
representation of cognizable groups. Saks and Hastie describe how 
statistical techniques can be used to test whether a discrepancy be-
tween an obtained and an expected racial composition of the venire 
is beyond chance occurrence. If it is, discrimination in venire selec-
tion is inferred. They then criticize the Supreme Court decisions in 
this area because the justices "have not made their mathematics ex-
plicit," relying instead on an "intuitive 'feel' for a 'significant' dis-
crepancy" (p. 53). 170 
A second application is the use 9f so-called scientific jury selec-
tion to supplement traditional voir dire questioning in impanelling 
the petit jury. Saks and Hastie provide an excellent description of 
this new method, which consists of using survey research methods, 
attitudinal measures, and statistical techniques to construct a psycho-
logical and demographic profile of a "favorable" juror that defense 
attorneys can use in screening veniremen. Although "virtually no 
one who has used scientific jury selection has lost a case" (p. 62), 
170. The aulhors have misread !he cases. The Court has consistently held that a prima 
facie case of invidious racial discrimination under the equal protection clause is not demon-
strated by improbability alone, and !hat proof of wrongful intent also needs to be established. 
In Whitus v. Georgia, 38S U.S. S4S, S52 n.2 (1967), !he Court applied probability analysis to 
show !hat !he large discrepancy between actual and expected black veniremen could not have 
been due to chance, but nonetheless ruled !hat such a showing was unnecessary because the 
selection process itself was not racially neutral. Accord, Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 
(1977); Alexander v. Louisiana, 40S U.S. 62S, 630 (1972). 
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they caution that its effectiveness cannot be evaluated absent con-
trolled comparisons. If the prosecution's evidence had been 
stronger, the defense lawyers less illustrious, and the political or ra-
cial element missing in the score of criminal conspiracy cases where 
this jury selection technique has been used, the trial outcome might 
have been different. The authors conclude with a thoughtful discus-
sion of the ethical and policy questions that this development poses 
for the adversary process. 
Supreme Court cases in the 1970s upholding state jury sizes of 
less than twelve171 (but not less than six)172 members and jury deci-
sions by less than unanimous verdicts173 were the catalyst for the 
revival of psycholegal research and of jury simulation research in 
particular. The decisions came at a time when psychologists were 
turning to social policy issues. The subject of the jury folded in well 
with long tradition of social psychological study of small groups. In 
determining the permissible size and unanimous verdict rules, the 
Court rejected centuries of common-law practice and adopted a 
functional test according to the e.ff ect of the changes on the purpose 
of the jury institution. With respect to size reduction in criminal ju-
ries, for example, the Court found that the difference between six-
and twelve-member juries was only "negligible" with respect to 
maintaining a representative cross-section of the community and 
safeguarding group deliberation, and that the six-member jury there-
fore preserved the basic role of the jury as a buffer between the gov-
ernment and the individual.174 Saks and Hastie present this legal 
background and then review the extensive experimental literature on 
the behavioral consequences of size reduction and majority verdicts. 
They conclude that the Court's finding of a "negligible" difference is 
not supported by the research evidence. Small juries reduce the 
probability that minorities will be represented and diminish the fre-
quency of hung juries. Majority verdicts could block meaningful 
participation in the deliberation by minority members, relegating 
them to a cosmetic role on the jury. 
The Court's use of research data in these jury decisions illustrates 
171. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). 
172. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978). 
173. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972). 
174. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 102 (1970). The Court's reasoning can be cast in 
syllogistic form: twelve is constitutional (based on history and precedents); the effects of six 
are only negligibly different from the effects of twelve (in terms of the purposes of ensuring a 
representative cross-section and unimpaired group deliberation); therefore, six is constitu-
tional. Psychological research, then, is brought to bear in testing the minor premise of the 
decision. 
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the possibilities and limitations of empirical analysis in constitu-
tional adjudication. Kalven has proposed that behavioral science 
can best contribute to legal problems that do not involve deeply held 
values and inaccessible facts (e.g., the wrongfulness of segregation) 
or facts too well-known to merit empirical documentation (e.g. , the 
general fallibility of the senses, or the unreliability of hearsay). 175 
What remains is a critical middle area "where the premises are not 
that unshakeable and where the facts are not that accessible." 176 It is 
in the determination of facts of "the middle range" 177 that empirical 
analysis is most useful. The effects of jury size and majority verdicts 
would seem to be middle range problems. Since there is no inherent 
value in any given size or verdict criterion so long as the functions of 
the jury remain unaffected, the Court relied on a means-end analy-
sis; as the authors put it, the "Court tried to answer empirical ques-
tions with empirical answers" (p. 79). 
It appears, however, that even in the middle range, behavioral 
data serve only an indirect or limited role in constitutional law-mak-
ing. The most interesting decision for purposes of analyzing this 
epistemological issue is.Ballew v. Georgia, 118 which invalidated juries 
with less than six members. The only reference to this case by Saks 
and Hastie is a statement that it is "noteworthy because the Supreme 
Court took generous note of the social science research" (p. 86). It is 
even more noteworthy because the Court distorted the research find-
ings, treating the conclusions as it would highly malleable case law. 
The eighteen studies179 the Court reviewed concluded that the effects 
of six- and twelve-member juries were different, yet the Court reaf-
firmed the constitutionality of six-member juries. 180 At the same 
time, the Court relied on studies showing differences between six-
and twelve-member juries to conclude that there was "[no] clear 
line"181 between six- and five-member juries. It then decided that 
five-member juries were unconstitutional. 182 The data were appar-
175. Kalven, The Quest for the Middle Range: Empirical Inquiry and Legal Policy, in LAW 
IN A CHANGING AMERICA 56 (G. Hazard ed. 1968). 
176. Id. at 67. 
177. Id. at 65. 
178. 435 U.S. 223 (1978). 
179. 435 U.S. at 231 n.10. 
180. As in note l74mpra, the reasoning can be restated in syllogistic form: twelve is con-
stitutional (this major premise is based on precedents and history); the effects of six are differ-
ent from the effects of twelve (as shown by the eighteen studies cited in footnote 10); therefore, 
six is constitutional (i.e., Williams is reaffirmed). Logically, of course, the deduction should 
have been that six-member juries are unconstitutional. 
181. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239 (1978). 
182. This is, of course, illogical. The Court is reasoning: six is constitutional (this is axio• 
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ently used to ornament a decision reached on other legal and policy 
grounds; 183 hence, a concurring opinion mocked the "heavy reliance 
on numerology."184 Still, this is not to say that because normative 
and political considerations were involved, empirical analysis was 
irrelevant. Constitutional issues can be decided only by appraising 
the factual grounds for governmental action. Documentation of the 
impact of size changes on the jury's purpose laid bare the value ques-
tions and helped frame the legal issue more sharply. Answers to or 
at least attitudes toward the factual questions were as essential to the 
outcome (albeit in an indirect way) as the doctrinal and policy analy-
sis. 
Saks and Hastie are to be highly commended for undertaking to 
pull together nearly 400 empirical references into an orderly whole. 
However, if there is one weakness ·of the book from a lawyer's view-
point, it lies in the organization. By structuring each chapter around 
a separate "actor," the book gives a static and fragmented picture of 
the criminal process. It fails to capture both the intricate web of re-
lationships that bind and define the different actors, and the non-
adversarial, assembly line processing of cases that characterizes the 
lower criminal courts. Saks and Hastie readily acknowledge this de-
fect at the end of the book: "Indeed, it would be more informative to 
ignore the entities composing the system and to look instead at the 
relationships among them" (p. 205). A remedial effort is made in the 
final chapter entitled "The Court as a Social System and as Part of a 
Social System." However, the belated introduction of system level 
concepts such as "inter-role conflict," "exchange relationships," and 
"social equilibrium" remains at a plane of abstraction removed from 
the behavior of criminal justice actors described in the preceding 
chapters. 
matic, established by Williams); the effects of five are not clearly different from the effects of 
six (supposedly shown by the eighteen studies); therefore, five is unconstitutional. The studies 
dealt only with the difference between six- and twelve-member juries. By generalizing the 
results to the difference between five- and six-member juries, the Court took into account the 
direction but not the magnitude of the change. If the Court cannot discern a "clear line be-
tween six members and five," the logical conclusion should have been that five is constitu-
tional. 
183. The Court proposed an alternative or additional test for determining the validity of 
jury size, namely, a balancing of the state's interest in the value of administrative efficiency 
(savings in court costs and time) against the individual's (and also society's) interest in the 
value of an impartial jury. 435 U.S. 223, 243-44 (1978). Ballew and the other jury cases of the 
1970s should be seen against the backdrop of a changing social-political climate - one that 
saw a nation increasingly worried about street crime, desirous of greater control over its local 
institutions, skeptical of national solutions to local problems - and "the new federalism" 
theme of the Burger Court. See generally, Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: 
State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 KY. L.J. 421 (1974). 
184. 435 U.S. 223, 246 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring). 
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Because the materials are organized around individual actors 
rather than selected issues inherent in the various phases of the crim-
inal process, the book is less meaningful to lawyers than it could 
be. 185 The chapters on jury selection and jury size will undoubtedly 
seize lawyers' imaginations because the research information is mar-
shalled, from the outset, around recognizable policy issues. The 
other chapters, in contrast, begin with and are structured around 
psychological themes. A chapter on "The Lawyer," for example, is 
divided into issues of persuasion, social perception, attribution the-
ory, and the like. This mode of presentation makes good sense for 
psychologists, but lawyers are not used to thinking along these lines. 
They are likely to approach the criminal process in terms of system 
level problems first, 'and then to tum to the social sciences for 
whatever contributions they may have to offer. It is incumbent upon 
the proponents of applying psychology to law to articulate the con-
nections between the two. To bring in the psychological research 
before the issues of legal interest are identified is placing the cart 
before the horse. 
Cohn and Udo!f's The Criminal Justice System and Its Psychology 
Written as a text for undergraduates, the book attempts "to pres-
ent and integrate both legal and psychological principles involved in 
the criminal justice system" (p. vii). On the assumption that "[n]o 
social scientist is likely either to work effectively within this system 
or to contribute sufficiently to its improvement without a basic un-
derstanding [of it]," the authors introduce "roughly equal amounts 
of psychological and legal concepts" (p. 1 ). The book appears to 
have two distinct foci. The first half covers criminal law and crimi-
nology, and the second half pertains to criminal procedure and so-
cial psychological research in criminal court. The latter half is 
coextensive in subject matter, if not in coverage, with the Saks and 
Hastie volume. 
The book begins with a three-chapter introduction to law. First, 
in eleven pages, the history and structure of the American legal sys-
tem is surveyed, and a potpourri of basic concepts defined (including 
185. Another consequence of this organizational format is the existence of some imbalance 
in the scope of coverage. Legally interesting topics regarding the criminal court process on 
which there is also substantial empirical research such as plea bargaining, fair trial versus free 
press, and prerecorded videotaped trials merited only one or two brief paragraphs. On the 
other hand, a single study on bail setting (that reached the unstartling conclusion that a prose• 
cutor's recommendation is the chief determinant of the bail amount set by the judge) was 
described in eleven pages (pp. 27-38), or about five percent ofthe entire book. It is the authors' 
prerogative, of course, to decide what to include and what to treat as primary material, but 
they should make explicit the criteria they use for selection. This they did not do. 
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stare decisis, civil actions, natural law, jurisdiction, and the Bill of 
Rights, to mention only a few). The chapter is disorganized and 
bears little relationship to the substance of the book. Next, six pur-
poses of the criminal law are enumerated, but only one of them -
punishment - is discussed because it is the "most universally 
agreed-on purpose" (p. 13). The authors describe it as no "better 
example of the Freudian defense mechanisms of rationalization," 
since psychology teaches that "punishment does not change behav-
ior" (p. 12). Yet they concede it is "simplistic in the extreme to ex-
trapolate from the behavior of [rats] to people" (p. 12). These kinds 
of sweeping assertions permeate the legal chapters of the book. The 
criminal process is lambasted as "a colossal failure" (p. 13), one that 
"causes more crime and recidivism than it prevents" (p. vii), but no-
where do Cohn and Udolf document their statements or qualify 
them as editorial opinions. At the same time, the authors say that 
the effectiveness of the criminal process is a "largely unanswerable 
question" (p. 13). The legal chapters read at times more like a polit-
ical tract than textbook material, and even then the authors are Ja-
nus-faced in their positions. The legal introduction mercifully 
terminates with an uncontroversial exposition of the principles of the 
New York Penal Code. 
The remainder of the first half of the book deals with criminol-
ogy: historical and modem theories of criminal behavior, vic-
timology, and career patterns of criminal justice officials. Unlike the 
legal chapters, which contain no references and are haphazardly 
written, the social chapters are the book's redeeming grace - they 
are well researched, clearly organized, and informative. 
The second half of the book again begins with several legal chap-
ters. They include descriptions of the pretrial stages, of the trial 
from jury selection to the verdict, and of post-conviction procedures. 
Structured more coherently than the previous chapters on criminal 
law, they provide an overview of the criminal process. However, 
there is virtually no mention of the constitutional dimensions of this 
process except for passing reference to Miranda 186 and Escobedo, 187 
which are the only cases cited. There is no discussion of any of the 
legal or policy issues that are at the cutting edge of criminal justice. 
And there is no integration of the legal materials with any of the 
social science chapters. One can diligently study these chapters with-
out learning how or to what extent the Bill of Rights restrains official 
186. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
187. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
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conduct or what kinds of questions to ask for purposes of research 
and reform. On the whole, the chapters read like a garden variety, 
continuing legal education lecture on trial practice given by a local 
practitioner - some practical information, a few generalities, and a 
lot of homilies. Advice (for the intended audience of undergradu-
ates?) such as the following abounds: "It is a good idea for opposing 
counsel to keep a poker face during summations and to avoid taking 
notes" (p. 198). "[I]t is extremely important that the lawyers do not 
give the jury the impression of talking down to them" (p. 179). 
"[R]udeness and abusive tactics on the part of counsel are not only 
poor trial strategy and a sign of bad manners, they are also unprofes-
sional conduct" (p. 179). 
The social psychology research is presented in three chapters. 
One deals with scientific jury selection. Compared to the treatment 
in Saks and Hastie's book, the chapter omits the legal context of the 
problem and is less analytical in assessing the technology. On the 
other hand, the chapter contains lively descriptions of its use in sev-
eral publicized cases. A second chapter on "Psychological Factors in 
Trials" encompasses eyewitness testimony, confessions, jury size, 
pretrial publicity, and courtroom persuasion. It is a less comprehen-
sive catalog of studies than the Saks and Hastie book, but each cited 
study is more richly described. Again, the research is presented in a 
legal vacuum. There is also little conceptual or methodological criti-
cism of the research. The chapter's virtue lies in a detailed and clear 
exposition of the selected studies. Finally, Cohn and Udolf include a 
chapter on imprisonment, covering legal and empirical studies of the 
death penalty. 
Cohn and Udolf do not attain their objective of integrating the 
psychology and law of the criminal process. The book conveys the 
image of two disciplines proceeding on parallel and nonintersecting 
tracks. Even the book's title is stated in the conjunctive ("and") 
rather than the prepositional form (psychology of criminal justice). 
It is not enough, and arguably unnecessary, to give a broad survey of 
criminal law and criminal procedure prior to addressing empirical 
inquiries. More important is an analysis of specific legal issues that 
pertain to the particular research. In an epilogue, the authors at-
tempt once more to identify "areas in which law and psychology 
have come together in the past" or in which "they will join in the 
future," and to make "predictions as to the contributions that psy-
chology" can make to criminal justice (p. 308). They propose that 
"the role of psychologists in improving our adversary legal system is 
... [almost] nonexistent" (p. 310). They criticize their colleagues 
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who recommend "replacing juries and the adversary system with an 
inquisitorial system" as being "learned in their science but abys-
mally ignorant oflegal theory" (p. 310). This is a specious argument 
because no such recommendation has ever been published, even in 
the days of yellow psychology. It is curious that after devoting one-
third of their book to psychological research on the adversary pro-
cess, the authors should suddenly conclude, without more, that all of 
the foregoing studies are legally irrelevant. They suggest, instead, 
that the role of psychologists is "more one of working within the 
[ criminal justice] system than one of changing it" (p. 311 ). By this 
they mean the preparation of probation reports, supervising proba-
tion officers, prescribing prison therapy programs, and serving as ex-
pert witnesses. Again, one wonders why they wrote a book on 
research when they argue that the usefulness of psychology to law 
lies in its clinical applications. Fortunately, not all psychologists 
share their vision of the psycholegal enterprise. 
The Legal Impact of Social Psychological Research on the Criminal 
Trial Process 
Except for research on jury selection, jury size, and majority ver-
dicts, current investigations on the criminal trial process have not left 
a distinctive mark on the law. The potential for making a significant 
contribution is there, however, if two principal shortcomings are 
remedied. 
One limitation is the inability to generalize simulation experi-
ments to the legal world. Most of the courtroom studies described in 
the two books just reviewed have high internal but low external va-
lidity. 188 Compared to the early reality experiments, 189 for example, 
current social psychological studies are much more rigorous in en-
suring that the results are due to the manipulated (rather than un-
controlled or unknown) variables, 190 but are no better in terms of the 
188. Internal validity, the sine qua non of experimentation, refers to whether the experi-
mental treatment actually affected the outcome. There is high internal validity when any 
changes in outcome can be attributed with considerable confidence to the experimental manip-
ulation rather than to some other (uncontrolled) factor. External validity refers to the extent of 
the generalizability of the results to different populations and settings. As with any question of 
inductive inference, it is never completely answerable. See D. CAMPBELL & J. STANLEY, Ex-
PERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH 5 (1963). 
189. See text at note 13 supra. 
190. In the jury experiments, for example, the differences in verdicts can be attributed 
quite confidently to the experimental manipulations of jury size, but in the reality experiments, 
the fallibility in the identification may be due to a variety of factors other than or in addition to 
the unreliability of the senses. See text at note 153 supra. This is not to say, of course, that the 
jury studies have no internal validity problems at all. For a discussion of possib!e uncontrolled 
variables that might produce confounding effects, see Bray & Kerr, Use of-the Simulation 
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generality of these results. 191 This is because simulated procedures 
often are not the functional equivalent192 of actual processes. Some 
of the most common sources that detract from the verisimilitude of 
laboratory studies include the following: selection of college stu-
dents rather than real jurors in mock juries; 193 recording of individ-
ual juror decisions rather than the group verdict; 194 presentation of a 
short, written transcript or audiotape of a trial rather than a more 
realistic audiovisual film; 195 introduction of experimental variables 
in ways that are disproportionate to their actual role in litigation, 
thereby artificially magnifying their impact; 196 omissions197 and er-
rors198 in simulated instructions to the mock jury; and "simulation" 
of court procedures that have no correspondence to the reality that 
purportedly is being simulated. 199 A clear lesson from the long his-
Method in the Study of Jury Behavior: Some Methodological Considerations, 3 LAW & HUMAN 
BEHAVIOR 107 (1979); Zeisel & Diamond, "Convincing Empirical Evidence" on t/1e Six Member 
Jury, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 281 (1974). 
191. "[R)esults of most laboratory-based studies [of juries] are of unknown and generally 
unknowable generality." Bermant, McGuire, McKinley & Salo, The Logic of Sim11/atio11 1i1 
Jury Research, l CRIM. JUST. & BEHAVIOR 224, 225 (1974). 
192. In simulation research, a distinction is made between functional and structural equiv-
alence. The former refers to the modeling of processes and functions and the latter to an exact 
laboratory replication of the real world phenomenon. Simulation studies in social psychology 
strive for functional verisimilitude. 
193. Real juries have been found to be less likely to convict than mock juries of the same 
size, presumably because the former have a more demanding standard of proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. Zeise! & Diamond, supra note 190, at 281 1h47. 
194. This is usually justified on grounds of financial and temporal economy. These arc 
true economies only if individual decisions are predictive of the group verdict, an assumption 
that receives some support in H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 163, at 488. 
195. The greater the verisimilitude, the lower the guilty rate in jury simulations. Specifi-
cally, the percentage of not guilty verdicts rendered by mock jurors when the evidence is 
presented in the form of a brief summary, a transcript, an audiotape, or an audiovisual film 
was found to be, respectively, 30%, 43%, 67%, and 78%. Bermant, McGuire, McKinley & Salo, 
supra note 191, at 230-31. 
196. For example, in one study one fourth of all of the information presented to the mock 
jury consisted of presentation of expert psychological testimony. It would be unusual in an 
actual trial to find such testimony representing that large a share of the proceedings. See 
Loftus, supra note 166. 
197. Oddly, simulations of criminal jury decision-making often do not include instructions 
to the jurors of the burden or standard of proof. This may partly account for the higher guilty 
verdicts found with mock rather than real jurors. See, e.g., id.; Hans & Doob, Section 12 of the 
Canada Evidence Act and the Deliberations of Simulated Juries, 18 CRIM. L.Q. 235 (1975-1976); 
Wolf & Montgomery, Ejfects of Inadmissible Evidence and Level of Judicial Admonis/1me11t to 
Disregard on the Judgments of Mock Jurors, 7 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCH. 205 (1977). 
198. It is not uncommon in criminal jury studies to find that the jurors are instructed to 
return a verdict of "innocent or guilty." In psychological texts, too, the jury's decision is for-
mulated in terms of an innocence standard rather than a "guilty or not guilty" verdict. See, 
e.g., Wolf & Montgomery,supra note 197, at 2ll-12; YARMEY, p. 24. Some studies ask mock 
jurors to give verdicts expressed in degrees of guilt. E.g., Sue, Smith & Caldwell, Effects of 
Inadmissible Evidence on the Decisions of Simulated Jurors: A Moral Dilemma, 3 J. APPLIED 
Soc. PSYCH. 345 (1973). 
199. See, e.g., Walker, Thibaut & Andreoli, Order of Presentation at Trial, 82 YALE L.J. 
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tory of eyewitness research is that the legal community is reluctant to 
embrace laboratory findings of suspect generalizability. Moreover, 
even when that methodological feature is unimpeachable, 200 another 
condition must be met to assure the legal applicability of the re-
search - it has to be directed toward questions of significance to 
law. 
A second limitation, then, is that many of the simulated trial 
studies, with the notable exception of the jury studies already men-
tioned, do not draw legally relevant conclusions because, in part, 
they do not take the legal implications of the problem into account. 
An example is found in the area of presentations of evidence and of 
law to the jury; specifically, in studies on the effect of judicial in-
structions on limited admissibility. This is at present a major subject 
of research and debate in the psychology of evidence law. Saks and 
Hastie as well as Cohn and Udolf review this literature. The "other 
crimes" evidence rule renders inadmissible a defendant's prior rec-
ord as part of the prosecution's case-in-chief for the purpose of 
showing probable guilt regarding the crime charged.201 However, it 
is admissible for the limited purpose of impeac_hing the defendant's 
credibility if he chooses to take the stand.202 The law attempts to 
protect the defendant from any adverse inferences by instructing the 
jury to consider the criminal record only for the authorized pur-
pose.203 The premise that a juror is capable and willing to compart-
mentalize the evidence as directed has been criticized by some legal 
216 (1972). In this widely cited study on order of presentation of evidence (see Saks & Hastie, 
pp. 105-07; Cohn & Udolf, pp. 222-24), the investigators counterbalanced the sequence in 
which the prosecution or the defense presented its evidence which consisted of statements of 
fact). This procedure does not simulate the opening statements phase of trial, since evidence is 
not ordinarily introduced at that time. It does not simulate the presentation of the cases-in-
chief of either the prosecution or defense, because in an actual trial any advantage that the 
prosecution may enjoy by proceeding first is offset by the defense's option to cross-examine 
immediately after any direct testimony. If order has any effect at all, it is probably at the 
summation phase of trial. But their procedure does not simulate it because the presentations 
are of facts, not of arguments. Further diminishing this study's verisimilitude was the absence 
of instructions on burden and standard of proof and the fact that the prosecution did not have 
the last word before the jury. The prosecution's presumed advantage of opening and closing 
the trial is justified in legal theory by the allocation of the high burden of proof to the state. 
Unless these two features are present in the simulated procedure, it cannot be said, as the 
authors assert, that their study "[incorporates] the essential characteristics of legal fact-find-
ing." Id. at 217. 
200. The foregoing criticisms of jury simulation are not meant to suggest that there are no 
sound studies. For a series of experiments of admirable verisimilitude and methodological 
cleanliness, see Miller, Bender, Boster, Florence, Fontes, Hocking & Nicholson, The Effects of 
Videotape Testimony in Jury Trials: Studies on Jurors .Decision Making, /'!formation Retention, 
and Emotional Arousal. 1975 B.Y.U. L. REV. 331. 
201. FED. R. Evm. 404(b). 
202. FED. R. Evm. 404(a)(3). 
203. FED. R. Evm. 105. 
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commentators204 and judges,205 and subjected to empirical testing by 
psychologists. 
In the typical experimental design, mock jurors listen to a taped 
criminal trial. Half of them are informed about the defendant's past 
record and half of them are not. A judge delivers limiting instruc-
tions to the first group. Several studies have found the instructions 
"futile"206 because more convictions are rendered when record evi-
dence is introduced. On this basis, researchers have proposed a 
blanket exclusion on the admissibility of prior criminality. Saks and 
Hastie conclude that "[t]he disturbing implication [of these studies 
is] that jurors will typically ignore or misunderstand instructions 
from the bench" (p. 39), and that in the area of evidence, "once 
again legal practice and scientific psychology are in conflict" (p. 
163). Commenting on these studies, Cohn and Udolf say the find-
ings are proof of "uncontrolled variables affecting the impact of a 
trial's structure on the jury" (p. 254). However, there are other stud-
ies, not discussed in either book, that show the opposite result: mock 
jurors who are given the limiting instruction render fewer convic-
tions than those not so instructed.207 Thus, other reviewers, noting 
these "conflicting results,"208 state that the effectiveness of the in-
structions is "uncertain."209 
An analysis of the policy of the rule suggests that the positions 
are not inconsistent. Here, as in other evidence rules, a balancing of 
competing values is inherent in the fact-finding process: full disclo-
sure to aid truth determination is balanced against fairness in the 
manner in which guilt is adjudicated. On the one hand, as an actu-
arial matter there is a strong association between past conduct and 
future propensity; wholesale exclusion of the record "would proba-
bly have as its principal consequence a lessening of the reliability of 
204. "A judge giving instructions is like a general giving orders without ever knowing 
whether they are carried out." Cleary, Evidence as a Problem in Communicating, S VAND. L. 
REV. 277, 294 (1952). 
205. "The naive assumption that prejudicial effect can be overcome by instructions lo the 
jury ... all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction,'' Krulewitch v. United States, 
336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J. concurring); limiting the evidence as instructed is "a 
mental gymnastic which is beyond not only their (the jury's] power, but everybody's [sic] else," 
Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932) (Learned Hand, J,); Frank, supra note 
68, at 184 (equating instructions with medieval exorcism). 
206. Hans & Doob, supra note 197, at 252. See also Doob & Kirshenbaum, Some Empirl• 
cal Evidence on the Effect of s. 12 of the Canada Evidence Act Upon an Accused, IS CRIM, L.Q. 
88 (1972); Wolf & Montgomery, supra note 197. 
207. Comish & Sealy, Juries and Rules of Evidence, 1973 CRIM. L. REV, 208. 
208. Davis, Bray & Holt, supra note 126, at 337. 
209. Id. 
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jury verdicts."210 On the other hand, it is contrary to the ideals of 
presumption of innocence and reformation of offenders to saddle an 
accused with the burden of his past misdeeds; unfettered admission 
could prejudice a jury and cause it to use a lower standard of proof 
with repeat offenders. What the law does, then, is to strike a com-
promise between the two extremes. If the limiting instruction is seen 
as a means of harmonizing competing values, one would expect con-
victions to be highest under unlimited admission, lowest under total 
exclusion, and in-between under limited admission. This, of course, 
is precisely what the seemingly conflicting results show.211 The in-
structions are effective in achieving the desired procedural equilib-
rium. 
Thus, unless researchers are informed about the legal dimensions 
of their psycholegal studies, they run the risk of drawing incorrect 
conclusions from the findings. In this instance, they have ap-
proached the problem solely on utilitarian grounds and neglected to 
consider that other social values, extrinsic to accurate fact-finding, 
are implicated in a trial. Moreover, they also run the risk of not 
recognizing and pursuing other legally interesting questions. The 
courts have analogized limiting instructions to a judicial "pla-
cebo."212 By definition, the pretended cure sometimes works, and 
sometimes fails. The research question, then, is not only whether 
these instructions are effective, but also under what circumstances 
they are likely to be more or less effective. The judicial literature is a 
mine of research ideas about possible determinants of effective-
210. I WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 105-36 (1980). In civil-law countries, prior record is admis-
sible to show bad character or propensity to crime. 1 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE§ 193 (3d ed. 
1940). 
21 I. In the Hans & Doob study, supra note 197, the percentage of guilty verdicts returned 
by "experimental" jurors instructed to limit the prior record (of robbery convictions) only for 
the purpose of evaluating credibility and not for determining the likelihood of the defendant's 
commission of the charged crime (of robbery) was 40%. The percentage of guilty verdicts 
returned by "control" jurors, who were not exposed to the prior record, was zero. Conse-
quently, Hans & Doob concluded the instructions were "futile." Id. at 253. In the Comish & 
Sealy study, supra note 207, there were four groups of mock jurors in a theft prosecution: (I) 
jurors exposed to the prior record of convictions (for offenses similar to the indicted crime) but 
given no limiting instructions: (2) jurors exposed to a dissimilar prior record but given no 
limiting instruction; (3) jurors exposed to a similar prior record and given the limiting instruc-
tion; (4) a control group of jurors not exposed to any prior record information and not given 
any limiting instructions. The percentage of guilty verdicts for each of the groups was, respec-
tively, 57%, 33%, 35%, and 27%. The third group is equivalent to the experimental group in the 
Hans & Doob study, and the fourth group, of course, was equivalent to their control group. 
Thus, contrary to conclusions that these studies show "conflicting results,'' the pattern of find-
ings is consistent with legal theory: limiting instructions are more effective (in terms of reduc-
ing guilty verdicts) than no instructions at all, but are less effective than the total exclusion of 
the prejudicial evidence. 
212. United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 574 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting). 
704 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 79:659 
ness213 - such as the length of the prior record, the amount of other 
incriminating evidence, the timing of the instructions, and the man-
ner in which they are delivered - that has yet to be exploited by 
psychologists. 214 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Some themes culled from the history of law and psychology can 
help place in perspective the current problems and future prospects 
of psycholegal research. The history is characterized by a succession 
of dialectical interchanges. At first, with simplistic optimism, psy-
chologists (at times joined by lawyers) propose that their methods 
and knowledge can be applied to the redemption of law. The over-
selling of psychology prompts the legal community to snap back and 
put psychologists in their place. This dampens further interest in in-
terdisciplinary collaboration and for a decade or so the law is left to 
213. See, e.g., Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957) (listing specific circum-
stances to be evaluated in any given case in determining whether limiting instructions provide 
sufficient protection). 
214. The law appears to maintain a paradoxical attitude toward jury instructions. On the 
one hand, it recognizes their futility; see note 205 supra. On the other, it continues to require 
that they be delivered because they might be efficacious. In Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 
565 (1967), the Court said: 
It would be extravagant in the extreme to take Jackson [v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) 
holding that a procedure in which the jury was instructed to disregard a confession if it 
first found it to be involuntary was violative of due process] as evincing a general distrust 
on the part of this Court of the ability of juries ... to sort out discrete issues given to 
them under proper instructions by the judge in a criminal case, or as standing for the 
proposition that limiting instructions can never purge the erroneous introduction of evi-
dence or limit evidence to its rightful purpose. 
Thus, there are two distinct yet related questions in the evaluation of these instructions. One is 
the factual question that is responsive to empirical research: are the instructions effective? But 
the courts are raising another, norm-oriented question: should the evidence have been ex-
cluded? If yes, they would say the instructions were ineffective and reverse the conviction; if 
they decide no harm ensued from its admission, they would conclude that there is no basis for 
claiming the instructions were not effective. Efficacy of instructions, then, is a judicial conclu-
sion made on normative grounds to justify the admission or exclusion of evidence. 
One could imagine a continuum of harm caused by the admission of the evidence. At one 
end, when the evidence was obtained by means that infringe upon constitutionally protected 
rights, there is an almost irrebuttable presumption of harm and courts are likely to say that the 
instructions are per se ineffective. E.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Bruton v. 
United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). At the other end, when the admitted evidence implicates 
no constitutional values and it does not appear that a defendant has otherwise been harmed by 
it (e.g., because there is overwhelming other evidence to support the conviction apart from the 
prejudicial evidence; see Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial· Of Balancing and Other Mat-
ters, 70 YALE L.J. 763, 784-85 (1961)), courts are likely to conclude that the instructions are 
effective and let the jury verdict stand. In between, there is a large, nebulous middle zone, 
where the challenged evidence causes no clear constitutional harm, but a general issue of fair-
ness is raised. It is here that the possibilities for empirical research are the greatest. The fac-
tual issue of efficacy comes to the fore when the answer is not foreclosed or determined a priori 
by normative considerations. If the critical evidence is not inherently inadmissible or irrepara• 
bly prejudicial, courts are unlikely to disturb the jury's decision. The task for empirical analy-
sis is to determine the conditions of efficacy in this middle range. 
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muddle along its own way. The lessons are later forgotten and a new 
cycle of approach-rebuff-withdrawal is repeated. The debates dur-
ing the different periods of this history - between Munsterberg and 
Wigmore, Robinson and Mechem, Clark and Cahn - illustrate this 
contrapuntal pattern. In the best of times, an uneasy partnership has 
prevailed;215 in the worst of times, there has been outright hostility; 
in between and most of the time, each side carried on "as though the 
other did not exist."216 During the present boom period of psycho-
legal research, there has not been any instance of outright rejection 
by the legal profession. Indeed, some legal scholars have viewed fa-
vorably,217 though with a critical methodological eye,218 this research 
revival. So long as psychologists do not overshoot their mark and 
are sophisticated about the role and limitations of empirical inquiry 
in the legal process, they are unlikely to visit upon themselves the 
kind of legal reproach experienced in the past. The field has now 
come of age in several key respects. 
First, there is increasing consciousness that psycholegal studies 
require, as psychologists of the realist period indicated, more "sensi-
tivity to the lawyer's point of view."219 "[T]he first step in the devel-
opment of legal psychology should be a[n] . . . analysis of legal 
situations."220 Without a conception of the legal parameters of a 
problem, there is no assurance that the particular aspect being stud-
ied has any special importance, or even relevance, to the policy con-
cerns of lawyers. In an applied endeavor, it is more important to 
produce answers that are meaningful to law than to ask questions 
that are of interest to psychological theory. Psychologists today are 
not insensitive to this. If there is one feature that distinguishes the 
four books reviewed here from past publications by psychologists, it 
is that now there are deliberate efforts to integrate the research into a 
legal framework. Arguably these efforts have not always been en-
tirely successful, but from a long-range viewpoint, that they are be-
ing undertaken is in itself promising. 
Second, a critical mass of specialists in psycholegal studies is now 
215. See generally Katz & Burchard, supra note l. 
216. Fahr, Why Lawyers are Dissati.ified With the Social Sciences, l WASHBURN L.J. 161 
(1961). 
217. Friedman,supra note 124, at 1070, noting that the "boom" in psycholegal research is 
"long overdue" and that "(t]here is bound to be more action in the future." 
218. See, e.g., DamaSka, Presentation ef Evidence and Facifinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L. 
Rev. 1083 (1975) for a critique of the procedural justice experiments of J. THIBAUT & L. 
WALKER, supra note 125. 
219. Powers, supra note 65. 
220. Slesinger, supra note 63, at 680. 
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forming, a resource that did not exist before and is necessary to the 
development of any discipline. In the past, even as recently as the 
early 1970s,221 the principal professional interest of most of the per-
sons writing on psychology and law was elsewhere. Authors tended 
to be recognized authorities in traditional areas of legal or psycho-
logical scholarship who forayed into this interdisciplinary area as a 
collateral or one time undertaking. None of the scholars cited in the 
historical overview can be said to have achieved this professional 
distinction in psycholegal research. The four books of this Review 
are representative of current trends not only in terms of their content 
but also of their authorship. They are all by younger scholars who 
are now establishing their reputations - and establishing them prin-
cipally in law and psychology. They should be joined increasingly 
by others who have dual credentials (graduates of the various re-
cently formed programs) or are otherwise sufficiently informed in 
the methods of both disciplines, and who are also likely to identify 
themselves with this professional specialty. With more full-time 
workers expected in the vineyard, a more bounteous harvest may be 
reaped in the future. 
Finally, the nature of psycholegal research is undergoing change. 
In the past, the research consisted mainly of combining available 
psychological information with a legal problem. In the early writ-
ings on witness testimony or on the behavioral premises of evidence 
rules, for example, psychologists and lawyers would search through 
the inventory of psychology to see what could be pulled out and gen-
eralized in the legal context. The limitation on this approach was 
that psychology did not then, and does not now, possess a corpus of 
reliable information that can be directly transferred to particular le-
gal issues. The research literature is written and organized not to 
address applications but to test theories. Moreover, even though 
some basic research might have implications for a legal problem, the 
applicability might not be immediately obvious. 222 The present 
trend is not merely to extrapolate from existing knowledge, but to 
221. Saks,supra note 2, at 897-98, noted that most of the contributors to a 1971 symposium 
issue on psycholegal research were established or emeriti scholars, who represented "the ac-
complishments that have been, and less those that are." 
222. A good example is given by Kalven, supra note 175, at 62. In research that led to The 
American Jury (see H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL,supra note 163), Kalven and Zeise! were familiar 
with classic experiments on social conformity but did not initially sense their applicability to 
the problem of hung juries. These experiments had found that a subject was more likely to 
resist majority influence if he had at least one other ally who disagreed with the majority. It 
was not until they had done research directly on the legal problem, finding that juries initially 
split 11 to I would not hang but those split 10-2 would, that they realized there was congruence 
between their jury data and the previously reported studies on conformity. 
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engage afresh in research specifically tailored to given issues, as ex-
emplified by the jury size studies. The coming of age signals a 
change in the approach to psycholegal research - from one of col-
lating "psychology and law" to an emphasis on de novo research on 
the "psychology of law." 
